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The Lee Arthur Hester Case and the Unfinished
Business of the United States Supreme Court to
Protect Juveniles During Police Interrogations
Steven A. Drizin**
ABSTRACT
In 1961, on the eve of the Warren Court's “due process revolution” in the area of
constitutional criminal procedure and in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, a
fourteen-year-old black boy named Lee Arthur Hester was arrested and charged with
raping and murdering a white teacher in Chicago. The unrepresented Hester confessed
shortly after an interrogation by four police officers who accused him of the crime and
told him that they had evidence linking him to the crime. He immediately recanted his
confession when allowed to see his mother and an attorney. Hester's attorneys moved to
suppress his confession but a judge admitted it, and although Hester's confession made
little sense and Hester's teacher gave him an alibi, Hester was convicted. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in 1969. In their written briefs and at oral argument, Hester's attorneys boldly
asked the Court for a per se rule excluding all confessions taken from juveniles who are
unrepresented by counsel. The Court surprised the parties by dismissing the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. This article tells the untold story of Lee Arthur
Hester and his case, raises questions about Hester's guilt, and takes the Supreme Court
to task for failing to use Hester's case to provide greater protections to juvenile suspects
during police interrogations.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1994, shortly after I started working at Northwestern University School of
Law‘s Bluhm Legal Clinic, Tom Geraghty, the Clinic‘s Director, and I began working on
a series of high-profile juvenile murder cases with our students. The cases had a familiar
script. Our clients were typically under the age of fifteen. They had confessed after
being interrogated by Chicago detectives. No attorneys or parents were present with
1
them when they confessed. Although a ―youth officer‖ was present, he did nothing to
protect the juveniles‘ interests. Other than introducing himself, the youth officer sat
2
silently while the juveniles waived their Miranda rights and gave their confessions. It
was during this time frame that Tom first started talking to me about the Illinois case of
3
People v. Hester.
According to Tom, the Hester case was the leading Illinois Supreme Court case
regarding juvenile confessions when he had started practicing law in the late 1960s. Tom
also had a vague recollection of reading about Hester‘s arrest in the Chicago newspapers
in April of 1961. At the time, Tom was in high school (I was in utero), and he recalled
that the case had involved a young black boy of low intelligence who had been convicted
of raping and murdering a white teacher in a Chicago public school on the South Side of
Chicago. He also told me that something about the case ―just never felt right to him.‖
4
Tom‘s gut feeling about the case stuck with me, but for years I did not have the time, the
legal experience, or the perspective to do justice to the Hester case.
1

The Illinois Juvenile Court Act requires that police officers who take a juvenile suspect into police
custody must make immediate and reasonable attempts to notify the juvenile‘s parents or guardian and to
take the suspect to a youth officer without unnecessary delay. 705 I LL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-405 (1999).
The youth officer‘s role, however, is undefined when it comes to police interrogations. Typically, they are
present to ensure that a defendant is given his Miranda rights and to protect the juvenile against police
coercion. But youth officers have divided loyalties. They have a ―protective role‖ when it comes to the
juvenile suspects but they are police officers who are far lower on the pecking order than the detectives
who conduct the interrogations. In my experience, youth officers typically do nothing to ensure that the
juvenile understands his or her Miranda warnings or knowingly and intelligently waives them. I‘ve never
seen a youth officer challenge the aggressive or coercive tactics of the detectives. When called to testify,
they invariably become State‘s witnesses against the juvenile, backing up the detectives‘ accounts of the
interrogation in all respects.
2
These cases included A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming grant of writ of habeas
corpus based on involuntariness of eleven-year-old‘s confession); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757(7th
Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of writ of habeas corpus in case of fourteen-year-old who confessed); and In re
M.W., 731 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (affirming trial court decision that mentally retarded thirteenyear-old did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights). In Hardaway, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that the youth officer gave about ―as much assistance as a potted plant.‖ Hardaway, 302 F.3d at
765.
3
People v. Hester, 237 N.E. 2d 466 (Ill. 1968).
4
One thing I have learned since becoming Legal Director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions (CWC) is
to trust the ―gut feelings‖ of veteran criminal defense lawyers, especially when they start talking about that
one case that ―keeps them up at nights‖ or that ―still bothers them.‖ In fact, several of our exonerations at
the CWC have come after investigations we initiated on the basis of such ―war stories‖ from lawyers.
Comments from Thomas Breen, a well-respected defense attorney in Chicago and a former Cook County
State‘s Attorney, led CWC attorneys to launch an investigation into the rape and murder convictions of
Michael Evans and Paul Terry. This investigation led Center attorneys to seek DNA testing which
eventually exonerated both men after they served twenty-seven years in prison. See Steve Mills & Jeff
Coen, DNA Tests Gain Release of 2 in „76 Rape; Freedom Sweet for Men in Prison More Than 25 Years,
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By 2009, however, I was both ready and able to begin a case study of Hester.
Between 1994 and 2009, my primary focus, both in my casework and my scholarship,
had been on false and coerced confessions of juveniles. One case in particular, involving
5
an eleven-year-old boy who falsely confessed to murdering his elderly white neighbor,
sent me on an odyssey to understand everything I could about why juveniles are more
likely than adults to falsely confess when pressured by adult authority figures. During
that intellectual journey, I had studied the most important United States Supreme Court
cases on juvenile interrogations and confessions and thought I knew about as much on
these matters as I could know.
I was wrong. Little did I know when I began my research for this Article that the
case of Lee Arthur Hester would enrich my knowledge of the law relating to juvenile
interrogations and confessions. Little did I know that it would expand my understanding
of race relations in Chicago, the civil rights movement, the Warren Court‘s due process
revolution, and one of the saddest chapters in the Supreme Court‘s history—the
resignation of Associate Justice Abe Fortas. Little did I know that I would come to
believe in Hester‘s innocence and that I would meet Lee Arthur Hester. Little did I know
that he would become my client.
At the start of this project, I was interested in Hester‘s case for a number of
reasons. First, Hester has been a thorn in the side of juvenile defendants in Illinois for
more than forty years. In 1968, in Hester‘s case, the Illinois Supreme Court had the
opportunity to create special protections for juvenile and mentally limited defendants
during interrogations. As a result of its failure to do so, juvenile defendants to this day
are paying a heavy price. Hester still gets cited for the general proposition that ―youth
and subnormal intelligence do not ipso facto‖ render the defendant‘s confession
6
involuntary, words which every defense lawyer knows usually signal that the reviewing
court either plans on upholding the trial court‘s decision to admit a confession as
7
voluntary or plans on reversing a court‘s decision to suppress one as involuntary. But
what would the Hester case stand for if Hester‘s confession was false and this terrible
precedent was based on the false premise that Hester was guilty of the crime?
Hester‘s case also interested me because the Illinois Supreme Court‘s decision was
out of step with the path being forged by the United States Supreme Court and seemed

CHI. TRIB., May 24, 2003, at 1. Similarly, my decision to represent Thaddeus Jimenez was sparked, in part,
by my conversation with Cynthia Leyh, a Cook County assistant public defender, who I came to know and
respect during my years of practicing in juvenile court. When I called Leyh about Jimenez‘s case, she
immediately recalled the case and urged me to take it because she was convinced that Jimenez was
innocent. Jimenez was exonerated in 2009 and another man has since been charged with the murder. See
Maurice Possley, Arrested at 13, Inmate Freed, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 4, 2009, at 5.
5
See A.M., 360 F.3d 787.
6
See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 519 (Ill. 2009) (―A defendant‘s youth and subnormal
intelligence do not ipso facto render the defendant‘s confession involuntary.‖).
7
Id. at 260–64. In Richardson, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Appellate
Court, holding the appellate court did not give sufficient deference to the trial court‘s credibility findings
concerning the testimony of the police officers in finding that the officers had coerced Richardson‘s
confession. Id. Richardson was a mentally retarded sixteen-and-a-half-year-old who was beaten while in
police custody and given a black eye. Id. at 504. The beating took place before the interrogation and was
the apparent work of a jailer or lockup keeper and not the interrogators who took the confession. Id.
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destined to be reversed. Beginning in 1948, with Haley v. Ohio and continuing with
9
10
Gallegos v. Colorado and In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that youthful suspects are not the equals of their adult interrogators. To put them on ―less
unequal footing‖ with their interrogators and to safeguard against involuntary confessions
and unknowing and unintelligent waivers of their constitutional rights, the Court
11
contemplated giving special protections to juvenile suspects.
The Court moved incrementally, repeatedly cautioning trial court judges to
scrutinize juvenile confessions with ―special care,‖ especially in cases where juveniles
were left to fend for themselves without adult guidance. Although the Court stopped
short of issuing per se rules requiring parents or even attorneys for children during
interrogations, statements made by the Court in Gault in 1967 about the critical need for
counsel by juveniles left little doubt that the Court was leaning in that direction. With a
12
solid block of five votes—Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Fortas, Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall—and perhaps a sixth vote in Justice Black—there was reason to
be optimistic that greater protections were in the offing for juvenile suspects during
interrogations in the post-Gault era. All the Court needed was the right case.
The Hester case had all the bona fides of a precedent-setting case—it was built
largely on a confession, taken from a boy of low intelligence, during an interrogation
conducted outside the presence of parents or counsel. Hester‘s attorneys also raised
serious questions about Hester‘s guilt, arguing vehemently that the confession was
13
false.
Hester‘s case had another thing going for it: a strong dissent from a highly

8

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
10
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11
David T. Huang, Less Unequal Footing: State Courts‟ Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During
Interrogations and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437 (2001).
12
Fortas was perhaps the greatest champion of the rights of juveniles, giving juveniles many of the same
due process rights as adults in both Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) and In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
Moreover, he was prepared to go even further, giving juveniles all of the same due process rights afforded
adults, and perhaps some additional rights. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 456 n.20
(1990). For example, Fortas was poised to give juveniles the right to a trial by jury in all cases involving
crimes which would be felonies if committed as adults. Id.
13
Brief of Petitioner at *53–*75, Hester v. Illinois, 90 S. Ct. 1408 (1969) (June 16, 1969), 1969 WL
119867. Innocence matters. Less than a year before Miranda v. Arizona, Yale Kamisar was on a panel of
four speakers discussing the Supreme Court‘s criminal procedure decisions at the annual conference for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Yale Kamisar, A Look Back on a Half-Century of
Teaching, Writing and Speaking About Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 69,
74–75 (2004). To his surprise and the surprise of the other panelists, Chief Justice Earl Warren and
Associate Justice William Brennan, walked in to the auditorium and were escorted to the front row. Id. at
74. After Michael Murphy, the former Police Commissioner of New York City ranted about the Court‘s
coddling of criminals, Kamisar spoke and his spirited defense of the rulings received raves from the
audience. Id. Justice Brennan was not as impressed; he took Kamisar aside and told him that the next time
he defended the Court‘s rulings, he should highlight the case of George Whitmore, a nineteen-year-old
African-American man who had falsely confessed to and been wrongfully convicted of the murder of two
young female Manhattan socialites on the Upper East Side. Id. at 75. Indeed, when the Miranda decision
was issued in June 1966, the Court cited the Whitmore case in a footnote in its opinion. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.4 (1966). See ROB WARDEN and STEVEN A. DRIZIN, TRUE STORIES OF FALSE
CONFESSIONS 389–412 (2009), for more on the Whitmore case.
9
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respected Illinois Supreme Court justice, Justice Walter V. Schaefer, who wanted his
14
brethren to find the confession to be involuntary and to reverse Hester‘s conviction.
The plot grew thicker when I learned, to my great surprise, that the United States
Supreme Court had, in fact, granted certiorari in Hester‘s case. Not only had certiorari
been granted, but the case was fully briefed and orally argued before the Court in
November of 1969. The Court seemed poised to issue a momentous opinion, but on
April 25, 1970, the Hester case came to an unceremonious end. The Court dismissed
15
Hester‘s writ of certiorari as ―improvidently granted,‖ a procedure that is usually only
used by the Court when new information comes to light between the time of the grant of
certiorari and the time of the Court‘s decision on the merits that makes the case no longer
16
ripe for adjudication.
So what happened? Why didn‘t the case of Lee Arthur Hester join the ranks of
Haley, Gallegos, and Gault and continue the Court‘s legacy of giving children greater
protections than adults in their stationhouse encounters with police? What changed
circumstances had taken place between the grant of certiorari and the merits decision to
lead the Court to dismiss Hester‘s case? To answer this question, this Article will revisit
the time in which the Hester case was decided and place the Hester case into a historical
context. I will discuss the change in the Court‘s personnel that eventually doomed
Hester‘s chances and stopped the Court‘s protective legacy of juvenile suspects in its
tracks. I will reveal—for the first time—why the United States Supreme Court chose to
dismiss after oral argument not only Hester‘s case, but the case of a second juvenile
suspect whose murder confession was obtained under even more coercive
circumstances—the case of Willie Monks. Finally, I will argue that the Court, by failing
to rule in these cases, missed a golden opportunity to protect child suspects and that in the
years since Hester, the consequences of this missed opportunity have manifested again
and again in the form of coerced and false confessions from youthful suspects, including,
perhaps, the confession of Lee Arthur Hester.
II.

¶11

[2011

CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTS IN THE 1960S

In the spring of 1961, the United States Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, was about to embark on its ―due process revolution‖ in the area of criminal
procedure. Mapp v. Ohio, the landmark case that applied the Fourth Amendment‘s
exclusionary rule for unlawful searches and seizures to the states by way of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, had been argued before the Court on
March 29.17 The decision by the Supreme Court in Mapp, issued just a few months later
on June 19, 1961, was the first in a series of decisions that would bestow a dizzying array
of new constitutional protections upon criminal defendants in state and federal court
18
cases.
14

People v. Hester, 237 N.E.2d 466, 483 (1968) (Schaefer, J, dissenting).
Hester v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 660 (1970).
16
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 328–32 (8th ed. 2002).
17
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18
Other landmark cases in criminal procedure to follow included Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661
(1962), applying the Eighth Amendment‘s right against cruel and unusual punishments to the states;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states
15
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In the area of police interrogations and confessions, the due process revolution
arguably had begun as early as 1936, when the Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s ―fundamental fairness‖ doctrine to prevent states from using confessions
19
that were the products of physical or mental coercion against defendants.
That
20
movement reached its zenith in 1964 with Escobedo v. Illinois and in 1966 with
21
Miranda v. Arizona, perhaps the most controversial of the Warren Court‘s criminal
procedure decisions.
In Miranda, the Court launched its most pointed attack on the ―interrogation
atmosphere and the evils it can bring.‖22 Relying on the leading police training manuals
to describe the interrogation process, the Court characterized interrogations as inherently
―compelling‖ and filled with pressures designed to ―undermine the individual‘s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.‖23 In order
to dispel this coercion and combat these pressures, the Court held that ―the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.‖24 The procedural safeguards
recommended by the court were the now-familiar Miranda warnings advising suspects of
their right to silence, that anything the suspect says can be used against him or her in a
court of law, that he or she has the right to consult with an attorney prior to answering
questions, and that a suspect has the right to have an attorney appointed free of charge if
25
he cannot afford one.
The Court further held that a suspect may waive his
constitutional rights but that such a waiver must be made ―voluntarily, knowingly, and
26
intelligently.‖

and requiring states to provide counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964), applying the Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against compelled self-incrimination to the states; and
In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), giving juveniles many of the same constitutional rights as adults in their
adjudicatory hearings.
19
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
20
378 U.S. 478 (1964). Miranda was preceded by Escobedo, a confusing decision which, if broadly
construed, held that suspects had the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment during the pre-indictment
stage ―when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when the focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession.‖ Id. at 492. As Yale Kamisar notes, Justice Goldberg‘s opinion, at times,
so strongly rejected the idea that police have an opportunity to interrogate suspects that it ―promised or
threatened to extinguish all police interrogations.‖ Yale Kamisar, Miranda, The Case, the Man, and the
Players, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1076 (1984). A more limited reading, however, confining Escobedo to its
facts, limited the right to counsel to cases in which the suspect, like Escobedo, had specifically requested to
see his attorney and his attorney was in the stationhouse seeking to speak to his client. Id.
21
384 U.S. 436. Miranda actually ―displaced‖ Escobedo, grounding a suspect‘s pre-indictment protections
in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and clarifying that the suspect‘s right to be
informed of his right to counsel and to silence began at the point when the suspect was ―in custody‖ and
being ―interrogated.‖ Kamisar, supra note 20, at 1076–77.
22
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456.
23
Id. at 467.
24
Id. at 444.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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The Miranda decision left many questions unanswered, including whether
27
Miranda applied to juvenile court proceedings and whether special protections were
needed to ensure juvenile suspects understood their rights and ―voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently‖ waived them. Some of these questions were answered a year later in
Gault, a case not primarily about interrogations, but about the constitutional infirmities of
the juvenile court system.28 In giving defendants in juvenile court many of the same
rights afforded adult defendants, including the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination, Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, echoed the concerns raised
earlier by Justice Douglas in Haley and Gallegos that youthful suspects would fail to
understand and appreciate these rights and would be easily manipulated into giving them
up.29 He singled out the importance of counsel in ensuring that juveniles understood their
rights before speaking to the police, seeing the participation of counsel not as an
impediment but as an ―assist‖ to ―the police, Juvenile Courts, and appellate tribunals‖ in
30
administering the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Fortas warned judges to
be especially wary of confessions obtained in the absence of counsel:
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission
was obtained . . . the greatest care must be taken to assure that the
admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or
suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.31

¶15

Justice Fortas went even further, expressing concern not only with the
voluntariness of juvenile confessions but also with their reliability. In dicta, he wrote that
―common observation‖ and ―expert opinion‖ suggested that a ―distrust‖ of confessions
was particularly necessary in the cases of children and that ―authoritative opinion has cast
formidable doubt on the reliability and trustworthiness of ‗confessions‘ by children.‖32 In
several instances, Fortas put the word ―confession‖ in scare quotes to signal his
skepticism about the worth of such evidence.33 In his discussion of two recent cases from
the highest courts in New York and New Jersey, he raised serious questions about the

27

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has never held that Miranda‟s exclusionary rule applies to
juvenile proceedings. In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979), the Court assumed, without
deciding, that the Miranda warnings applied to the case at hand.
28
See In re Gault, 387 US 1, 55 (1967).
29
Id. at 45, 54–55.
30
Id. at 55. Both Justices Fortas and Douglas, had serious reservations about the ability of juvenile
suspects to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive their constitutional rights. They also thought the
mere fact that a juvenile suspect was read his rights and had waived them was entitled to little weight. In
Haley, Justice Douglas perhaps best expressed this skepticism of juvenile competency, writing that ―we
cannot give any weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements‖ and refusing to
indulge the assumption that ―a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that
advice.‖ Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
31
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
32
Id. at 56.
33
See, e.g., id.
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reliability of these confessions, noting that the boys‘ statements in both cases were
inconsistent with the facts of the crime.34
To the law enforcement community, many of whose members were still reeling
from Miranda, Gault must have felt like having additional salt poured on its wounds.
What was the Court saying about juvenile confessions? If giving Miranda rights to
juveniles did not protect against involuntary confessions, how were police officers
supposed to interrogate juvenile suspects? Was the court suggesting that all juvenile
confessions would be inadmissible? The fact that Justice Fortas‘s decision commanded
eight of the Court‘s votes in Gault 35 also must also have concerned law enforcement.
These concerns no doubt only escalated when shortly after Gault, President Johnson
appointed Justice Thurgood Marshall—the first African-American on the Court and a
man whose long record of civil rights victories suggested he would firm up the Court‘s
liberal wing—to replace retiring Justice Tom Clark.36
It was in this volatile legal atmosphere that the case of Lee Arthur Hester made its
way to the United States Supreme Court. But Hester‘s case actually began nearly eight
years earlier in the midst of the national struggle of blacks for basic civil rights and
equality and in a city—Chicago, Illinois—that was and still is one of the most racially
segregated major cities in the United States.37
III.

¶18
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THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH SIDE OF
CHICAGO IN THE 1960S

The United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren was not the
only place where change was afoot in the 1960s. Early in the decade, civil unrest on the
34

Id. at 47. The two cases were In re Gregory W., 224 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1966) and In re Carlo
and Stasilowicz, 225 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1966). At least one of the confessions at issue in the New York case of
In the Matter of Gregory W. was, in all probability, a false confession. As Justice Fortas noted, one of the
two ―Negro‖ boys in that case who had admitted to breaking into an elderly white woman‘s home in the
Bronx was a schizophrenic who had been locked up in a psychiatric hospital at the time of the murder. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
35
Although the vote to reverse Gault‘s conviction was 8 to 1, with Justice Harlan the only dissenting
justice, there was less support on the Court for Justice Fortas‘s views about the voluntariness and reliability
of juvenile confessions. Just how much support for these positions existed is hard to tell. First, these
statements were only dictum and a vote with Justice Fortas did not necessarily mean support for dictum.
Moreover, Justice White wrote a special concurrence in which he opted out of the part of the majority
opinion dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 64–65.
36
Predicting how Justice Marshall would vote on some of the remaining post-Miranda questions also was
not as simple as it seemed. Prior to joining the Court, Justice Marshall was the Solicitor General of the
United States and had argued for the Government in one of Miranda‘s companion cases, Westover v.
United States. He took the position that requiring federal law enforcement agents to notify suspects of their
right to counsel and silence would unduly burden the agents and prevent them from obtaining confessions.
The Miranda decision was Marshall‘s greatest defeat as Solicitor General. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 323 (1998). During his confirmation hearings, North Carolina
Senator Sam Ervin tried to convince Marshall to disavow the Miranda ruling and to agree that courts
should accept voluntary statements even if the suspect had not been read his rights. Marshall, like most
nominees to the Court, refused to address specifics but did remark: ―Well Senator, the word voluntary gets
me in trouble. I tried a case in Oklahoma where the man ‗voluntarily confessed‘ after he was beaten up for
six days.‖ Id. at 335.
37
Azam Ahmed & Darnell Little, Segregation City: Racial Lines Were Drawn over the City‟s History and
Remain Entrenched by People‟s Choice, Economics, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2008, at 1.
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streets was brewing, especially in the South, as whites defiantly resisted the Supreme
Court‘s efforts to dismantle segregation, especially the Warren Court‘s landmark 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education pronouncing ―separate but equal‖ schools to be
unconstitutional.38 The first sit-ins began in February 1960 in Greensboro, North
Carolina, when four well-dressed black college students sat down at a luncheon counter
at a F.W. Woolworth‘s and asked to be served.39 By September 1961, more than 70,000
people had participated in sit-ins throughout the South, leading to the arrest of some
3,600 persons and sporadic violence in response to the protesters.40 The summer of 1961
was also the summer of the Freedom Riders, as whites and blacks from the North invaded
the South to fight segregation in Southern public transportation systems, provoking even
greater violence from Southern whites.41
Chicago, in the 1960s, was not immune from the problems of the racially
segregated South. By 1960, Chicago was home to one of the largest populations of
blacks in the United States, fueled by two ―Great Migrations‖ of Southern blacks. The
first ―Great Migration‖ occurred in the period from 1890 to 1930, swelling the population
of blacks from only 14,271 in 1890 to 233,903 in 1930.42 The second wave of the ―Great
Migration‖ of Southern blacks from the 1940s to 1960s was even more dramatic.43
Between 1940 and 1950, Chicago‘s black population rose by 214,534, and in the next
decade the population mushroomed by another 320,372.44
During the first Great Migration, blacks arriving in Chicago were confined to a
small cluster of undesirable neighborhoods in the South Side known as the ―Black Belt,‖
unable to move freely to other neighborhoods as a result of restrictive covenants which
prevented the sale of homes to blacks.45 During the Second Great Migration, as blacks
flooded the city after World War II, most were also steered to the Black Belt. 46 The
entire city of Chicago was in the midst of a terrible housing shortage as returning
veterans also vied for housing in the city with the growing black population.47
Several factors combined to lead to more and better housing for Chicago‘s blacks
in the post-World War II era. Courts began to find restrictive covenants illegal, opening
up housing in the predominantly white areas that bordered the Black Belt.48 To meet a
housing shortage, developers in the 1950s built single-family homes for middle and upper
middle class families in the suburbs that ringed the city.49 These new homes were filled
38

See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–1963, 413
(1988).
39
Id. at 271.
40
Anthony Lewis, Sit-ins Pose a Basic Legal Question: Does the Constitution Apply when Discrimination
is Private, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1961, at E10; see also Marilyn Marshall, Forty Who Made a Difference,
EBONY, Nov. 1985, at 62.
41
BRANCH, supra note 38, at 451–91.
42
ARNOLD HIRSCH, MAKING OF THE SECOND GHETTO 16–17 (1998).
43
Id. at 16.
44
Id.
45
By 1920, the Black Belt was approximately three miles long but only seven blocks wide, ranging from
22nd Street to the North and 55th Street to the South and bounded by Wentworth to the West and Cottage
Grove to the East. Id. at 3.
46
Id. at 16.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 29–31
49
Id. at 27.
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almost exclusively by white families who fled their enclaves in the city for the suburbs.50
The departure of white families opened up new neighborhoods for blacks to occupy and
those with the money to do so began to flood into the better neighborhoods that bordered
the Black Belt.51
One such South Side neighborhood that opened up to blacks in the 1950s was
Englewood. Originally settled by Germans and Irish in the 1850s and 1860s, by the turn
of the century Englewood was home to a mix of Germans, Irish, Scots, Swedes, and
Polish and other Eastern European immigrants.52 In 1930, Englewood‘s population was
made up of 98.7 percent whites and 1.3 percent blacks.53 As blacks sought to move out
of the Black Belt, they were attracted by Englewood‘s large housing stock, good schools,
excellent public transportation, and thriving shopping district, anchored by a huge, blocklong Sears store at 63rd and Halsted.54
Black migration to Englewood, however, was slow in coming. By 1940, blacks
still made up only two percent of Englewood and only four percent of West Englewood.55
White resistance in Englewood to aspiring black homeowners is perhaps best exemplified
by an infamous incident that occurred in 1949. When blacks attended a union rally at the
home of a Jewish resident at 5643 South Peoria, a rumor circulated that the home was
being sold to a black family.56 For three days, up to 10,000 people rioted, attacking
blacks, Jews, Communists, and ―meddlers from the University of Chicago.‖57 By 1950,
the influx of blacks from the Great Migration brought the city‘s black population up to
fourteen percent, the population of blacks in Englewood to ten percent, and West
Englewood to six percent.58
The 1950s saw many of Englewood‘s whites depart. Many Irish residents who
lived in the northern sections of Englewood moved to the southwest, while the Germans
and Swedes fled to the Beverly and Morgan Park neighborhoods. 59 In the late 1950s,
many more blacks moved to Englewood, displaced by the construction of what would
later come to be known as the Dan Ryan expressway.60 By the dawn of 1960, blacks
50

Id.
Id. at 16, 27–28.
52
Chanel Polk & Mick Dumke, A Brief History of Englewood, CHI. REPORTER,
http://www.chicagoreporter.com/index.php/c/Sidebars/d/A_Brief_History_of_Englewood.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
West Englewood is a separate neighborhood to the west of Englewood that shared much of the same
history and culture. It was slower to integrate than Englewood, due in part to the fact that it was further
away from the Black Belt, as well as the fact that jobs from the stockyards, the Chicago Transit Authority‘s
bus barn, and the railroads kept white West Englewood residents put. When these jobs left the community
in the 1970s, so did West Englewood‘s whites. The greatest demographic shift in West Englewood
occurred between 1970 and 1980, when the African-American population doubled from 48 percent to 98
percent. See West Englewood, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI., available at
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1337.html.
56
Polk & Dumke, supra note 52.
57
Id.; see also Hirsch, supra note 42, at 89.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. (citing DOMINIC A. PACYGA & ELLEN SKERRETT, CHICAGO: CITY OF NEIGHBORHOODS). The Dan
Ryan Expressway exacerbated the problem of racial segregation in housing in Chicago. The path of the
expressway created a racial divide, with the resource-rich white ethnic neighborhood of Bridgeport (and the
home of Mayor Daley) to the west and the traditional Black Belt impoverished areas to the East. Those
51
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made up the majority of Englewood‘s population for the first time in its history. There
were more than 67,216 blacks living in Englewood, nearly sixty-nine percent of the
neighborhood‘s population.61
In April 1961, fourteen-year-old Lee Arthur Hester lived at 6213 Princeton
Avenue in Englewood, directly across the street from a campus that included three public
schools: the Englewood High School; the Princeton Annex, a school for dropouts; and the
Lewis-Champlin grammar school, which housed grades K-8.62 Hester lived in a small
house with his father Emmett, a city garbage truck worker, his mother Helen, and seven
brothers and sisters.63
IV.

¶26

¶27

¶28

[2011

A TEACHER IS MURDERED, A SUSPECT IS ARRESTED

On April 20, 1961, at Lewis-Champlin Elementary School, Josephine Keane, a
beloved teacher, went missing.64 A master teacher whose duties included mentoring
younger teachers and giving special tutoring to kids with learning and behavioral
disabilities, Mrs. Keane had last been seen at 9:30 a.m. outside of a book room on the
first floor where she often worked one-on-one with students.65 Because she did not have
an assigned classroom, her absence during the day did not arouse suspicion; but when she
failed to appear at the lunchroom and then did not meet her carpool colleagues for their
drive home at the end of the day, her colleagues began to worry.66
The principal organized a search party, and a posse of teachers and staff searched
the school for Mrs. Keane before arriving at the door of the book room.67 The door to the
room was locked.68 Because Mrs. Keane had been given the office key earlier in the day,
the principal summoned the chief engineer to assist in unlocking the door with his master
key.69 The door was opened and to everyone‘s horror, there lay Mrs. Keane in a pool of
her own blood, the apparent victim of a brutal stabbing and sexual assault.70
Chicago police officers soon swarmed the school, processing the crime scene and
looking for any evidence to help find the killer. Mrs. Keane was found on her back with
her overcoat thrown over her head.71 She had been stabbed seven times, four times in her
right side and three times in her upper left chest.72 Her undergarments had been torn off
and police suspected she had been sexually assaulted.73 The police collected Mrs.
Keane‘s blood spattered clothing and recovered some fingerprints and a palmprint from
blacks who were unable to leave the Black Belt were confined in new public housing buildings that
stretched alongside the Dan Ryan, including the twenty-eight buildings of the Robert Taylor Homes, which
later became a national symbol of the failure of the high-rise public housing experiment.
61
Id.
62
Pupil, 14, Admits Killing, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1961, at 1–2.
63
School Killer to Get Tests, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1961, at 1.
64
Woman Teacher Slain, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 21, 1961, at 1, 3.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 3.
67
Id. at 3.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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inside the bookroom.74 A grease smudge found on Mrs. Keane‘s undergarments also
intrigued the police, leading them to think that the killer might have come out of a
machine shop or a garage or that he might be a mechanic. 75 Detectives who processed
the crime scene also found microscopic bits of wood and fiber and metal in the victim‘s
underwear.76 At the time, Captain Daniel Dragel of the crime laboratory, downplayed the
importance of the particles and fibers, stating ―[t]he particles of wood fiber could have
come from a clothespin and the metal particles from a washing machine during
laundering. Who knows? But all this will be checked out.‖77 A note that Mrs. Keane
was apparently writing when she was interrupted by her attacker was also found under
her body with the heel-print of a man‘s shoe on the paper.78
None of the faculty or students could think of anyone who would want to kill Mrs.
Keane.79 She was beloved not only by the all-black student body but by the mixed black
and white faculty at the school.80
The Chicago police were interested particularly in finding the murder weapon—a
small knife—and the keys used to open and lock the book room door.81 However, by the
next morning, after an extensive search of the school grounds, neither piece of evidence
had been found.82 The police had few leads on the identity of the killer.83
The news that a white teacher had been murdered and raped in a Chicago public
school during a school day spread like wildfire. The next morning, stories of the
gruesome murder made the front pages of Chicago‘s many daily newspapers, including
the Tribune, the Sun-Times, Chicago‟s Daily American, and the Daily News.84 Reporters
were omnipresent at the school on the day Mrs. Keane was murdered and throughout the
next day, and were given extensive access to the crime scene and to the investigating
officers and school staff.85
Early on the morning after Mrs. Keane‘s murder, the police were given their first
lead. Two white Chicago detectives, Anton Prunkle and Sheldon Teller, 86 went into the
74

Knife, 2 Keys Sought in Slaying, CHI.‘S DAILY AM., Apr. 21, 1961, at 1, 5.
Grease Smudge a Clue: Lab Experts Analyze It, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 22, 1961, at 3.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Phillip J. O‘Connor, Pupils Rated Slain Teacher as the Best, CHI.‘S DAILY AM., Apr. 21, 1961.
80
Id.
81
Pupil, 14, Admits Killing, supra note 62, at 2.
82
Id.
83
Id.; see also Knife, 2 Keys Sought in Slaying, supra note 74.
84
See, e.g., Woman Teacher Slain, supra note 64 (Chicago Sun Times); Teacher Murdered in School, CHI.
TRIB. Apr. 21, 1961, at 1; Knife, 2 Keys Sought in Slaying, Knife, supra note 74 (Chicago‘s Daily
American).
85
That reporters were given access to the crime scene is evidenced by the fact that many of the newspaper
articles cited previously featured pictures of the crime scene, including the pool of blood on the floor of the
bookroom, the covered body of Mrs. Keane, and the refrigerator which was dusted for prints.
86
Sheldon Teller, the son of a well-known rabbi, had been on administrative leave from the Chicago Police
Department just prior to his work on the Hester case. In September of 1959, Teller and his partner were
indicted in federal court for conspiring to deal drugs. He was acquitted when the trial court judge ordered a
directed verdict in his favor. Only a few days after the Hester arrest, one of Teller‘s co-defendants was
sentenced to twelve years in prison. See, e.g., Dope Ring Leader Given 12 Years, DEFENDER, Apr. 26,
1961, at 1. Restored to active duty only a month before the Keane murder, Hester was Teller‘s first big
case since his return to the force and both he and the Chicago police department were likely eager for him
75
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front office and inquired of the secretaries whether any of the students in the school had
ever been in trouble for sexually inappropriate behavior. A white gym teacher told the
officers that one ―Negro‖ boy in particular had been accused of sexual misconduct with
another boy off-campus, although nothing came of the accusation.87 That boy, she told
the police, had been tutored by Mrs. Keane.88 His name was Lee Arthur Hester.89 Hester
was in the fifth grade.90 He was fourteen years old, three grades behind academically,
and was described by some teachers (and later by the press) as a ―problem child‖ who
frequently disrupted class.91
Following this conversation, the detectives went straight to the classroom of Jean
Webster, a young black teacher at the school, and asked to speak with Hester. Without
contacting Hester‘s parents, Prunkle and Teller took him out of the classroom and began
to interrogate him. According to Hester, Prunkle kicked him in the shins. Seeing what
looked like blood spots on his trousers and a long strand of hair on his sweater, Teller
decided to take Hester into police custody.92 Hester was allowed to go back to the
classroom to retrieve his jacket. When he told the class, ―They think I killed Mrs.
to redeem his image. In the days after Hester‘s arrest, Teller was lionized on the pages of the newspapers
and given great play for his role in effectuating Hester‘s arrest. Pupil, 14, Admits Killing, supra note 62.
87
Pupil, 14, Admits Killing, supra note 62, at 2.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.; see also Sheri Giles & Mort Edelstein, Good and Bad Opinions, Boy Held in Slaying—A Confused
Picture, CHI.‘S DAILY AM., 1961, at 6. With the exception of the Chicago Defender, the coverage of the
other Chicago dailies described Hester, who was only five feet tall and weighed less than 100 pounds, in
animalistic terms, using words like ―remorseless,‖ ―unusually powerful,‖ ―muscular as an ox,‖ ―tough,‖ a
―bully,‖ and a ―chronic troublemaker‖ who conducted a ―reign of terror among other children‖ and
allegedly ―molested‖ both girls and ―small boys.‖ See, e.g., Mort Edelstein, Police Reveal Terror by Youth
at School, CHI.‘S DAILY AM., Apr. 26, 1961, at 6. Nearly thirty years later, New York‘s dailies would use
similar terms to describe the boys who were arrested, convicted, and later exonerated of the sexual assault
and beating of the woman who became known as the ―Central Park Jogger,‖ and thirty-four years later,
with the coinage of the word ―superpredator‖ to describe black youth criminals, the use of such language
reached a new level. See LynNell Hancock, Wolfpack: The Press and the Central Park Jogger Case,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 38 (2003).
92
See Pupil, 14, Admits Killing, supra note 62; see also Det. Teller‟s Role in Case Hailed, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1963, at 3. One writer for the Daily News, who later would go on to become a Chicago icon, was
particularly gushing about Teller‘s redemption. See Michael Royko, Detective‟s Story Reads Like a Movie
Script, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1961 (describing the ―handsome, curly haired‖ Teller as an ―acedetective‖ and quoting Maurice Begner, Chief of Detectives, as saying: ―A month ago, I congratulated him
for coming back to work [and now] I wonder how often I‘ve got to keep congratulating him‖). In a few
years, Royko and Begner would eat their words. The federal government finally caught up with Teller,
arresting both Teller and his wife for their drug dealing operations in 1966 after a raid of their home
uncovered $45,000 in cash and drugs in Teller‘s wife‘s purse. Jury Indicts Teller, Wife in Dope Case, CHI.
TRIB., July 27, 1966, at 1. This time, Teller was convicted and sentenced to eighteen years in federal
prison. At his trial, he was represented by another Chicago attorney who would later gain prominence as
the Cook County State‘s Attorney. See 2 Detectives Convicted in Dope Trial, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1966, at
1. His name was Richard Devine. Id. In September of 1998, Devine would take heat after his office
charged two boys, ages seven and eight, with the murder of an eleven-year-old girl named Ryan Harris
based on little more than a confession of one of the boys. Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Cops Ignored
Clues that Case was Weak, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1998, at 1. The confession was soon proven false by DNA
evidence. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C.L. REV. 891 (2004).
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Keane,‖ the entire class broke out laughing, finding ludicrous the idea that Hester would
have hurt Mrs. Keane.93
Back at the police station, detectives grew even more suspicious of Hester when
they noticed what looked like a lipstick smudge on his jacket. They took Hester to the
Cook County Juvenile Detention Center, where they took his clothing and sent it to the
crime lab, gave him a white gown to wear, and placed him alone in a locked room for
four or five hours.94 At 4 p.m., four officers, two white sergeants in the homicide unit
and two black youth officers, began to interrogate Hester. According to these sergeants,
after some initial denials, Hester quickly confessed to the rape and murder after he was
told that evidence analyzed by the crime lab linked him to the crime. 95 At around 5:30
p.m., a court reporter and a Cook County State‘s Attorney came in to memorialize
Hester‘s confession. The confession was eight pages in length and was typed up on
carbon paper and signed by Cook County Assistant State‘s Attorney Louis Garippo,96
Hester, Sergeant William Keating, and the court reporter, Donald Flannery.
V.

¶35

THE CONFESSION NARRATIVE

Hester told Garippo that he saw Mrs. Keane in the book room at precisely ―two
minutes after ten‖97 when he and a friend named Sherman Baker were on their way back
from returning milk cartons to the cafeteria.98 Hester told Sherman to wait by the stairs
while he went in to see Mrs. Keane.99 Mrs. Keane was tearing a hole in a package of
93

Brief and Argument of Plaintiff in Error at 28–29, People of the State of Illinois v. Hester, No. 39588 (Ill.
1967) [hereinafter Hester‘s State Supreme Court Brief] (on file with author).
94
Id. at 30; see also How Science, Police Solved School Killing, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1961, at 1.
95
Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error at 11, People of the State of Illinois v. Hester, No. 39588 (Ill.
Dec. 29, 1967) [hereinafter State‘s Illinois Supreme Court Brief] (on file with author). Sergeant Killackey
testified at the motion to suppress and at trial that the interrogation of Hester was a ―conversation,‖ that no
one raised their voices, and that the officers merely took turns revealing to Hester that the crime lab had
found blood on his clothes, a white female‘s hair, some metal particles and some lipstick. Bill of
Exceptions, Vol. II at 2896–2900, People of the State of Illinois v. Hester, No. 39588 (Ill. Jan. 27, 1966
[hereinafter Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II] (on file with author). Killackey and the other officers denied telling
Hester that the blood, hair, or lipstick matched Mrs. Keane‘s. He denied calling Hester a liar or even
accusing Hester of committing the crime. Id at 2893, 2900. There is reason to believe that Killackey did
tell Hester that there was a match and did accuse Hester of the murder. In an interview with the Tribune
two days after Hester‘s arrest, Killackey described how Hester insisted on his innocence, saying ―God
knows I am innocent.‖ School Killer to Get Tests, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1961, at 1–2. In response to Hester,
Killackey is quoted as saying that he told Hester: ―God also knows what the results of the crime laboratory
tests are and you know they show you are the murderer.‖ Id. The article also reported that Hester started to
confess immediately after Killackey‘s response. See id. At trial, however, Killackey and the other officers
testified that Killackey was not even in the room when Hester first confessed and that Hester first confessed
to the two black officers after Killackey and Keating had left the room. Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II at 330–
331, 336–340, 374–380, People of the State of Illinois v. Hester, No. 39588 (Ill. Jan. 27, 1966 [hereinafter
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I] (on file with author); Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra, at 2908, B.
96
Louis Garippo was the son of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. He went on to have a
distinguished career as a prosecutor, a Circuit Court judge, and as a highly regarded criminal defense
attorney.
97
Statement of Lee Arthur Hester to Louis Garippo, Assistant State‘s Attorney, and William Keating,
Sergeant, Detective Div., Area 4, in Room 203, Family Court Bldg., 2246 W. Roosevelt, Chi., Ill. at 6:45
p.m. (Apr. 21, 1961) (on file with author).
98
Id. at 2–3.
99
Id. at 3.
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books.100 As he approached Mrs. Keane from behind, Hester had a knife up his sleeve.101
The knife was secured by a rubber band on his wrist and had been given to him earlier in
the day by a friend named Allen Randolph.102 As he walked into the book room, Hester
accidentally tripped on some books and the knife came out of his sleeve and somehow
ended up in his fist.103 As he was stumbling toward Mrs. Keane, he stuck Mrs. Keane in
her back.104 While trying to get up off of the floor, Hester slipped again on some books
and somehow stuck her again in the back.105 When Keane turned on her back, Hester,
now in an excited state, stuck her again twice, this time in the ―breast.‖106 He pulled up
her dress, cut her ―garter belt‖ with the knife, unzipped his pants, and then cut her
shorts.107 With his ―penis‖ out, he lay on top of her and ―squirted a little bit.‖ Hester
insisted that his penis was not inside of her. Next, Hester leaned over Mrs. Keane to see
if he could hear her heartbeat and in the process got some of Mrs. Keane‘s lipstick on his
coat.108 He left the room, locked the door with the key, which he found on the floor, and
―dropped the key somewhere‖ as he was running.109 He went back to class with
Sherman. He stayed in class until about ―five minutes before 12,‖ when he left for the
day.110
On its face, Lee Arthur Hester‘s confession made little sense. His description of
how the knife ended up in his fist is almost impossible to imagine as is his description of
how he accidentally came to stab Mrs. Keane; the confession contained language that a
fourteen-year-old mentally limited child would never have used (for example ―garter
belt‖ ―breast‖); the highly specific time frames in the confession (for example, ―two
minutes after ten‖, ―five minutes to twelve‖) seem scripted to fit a police theory of when
the crime happened; and the explanation for how ―lipstick‖ got on his coat seems scripted
to conform to what police knew about the forensic evidence.111 It is also hard to fathom
how Hester could have committed the crime in the narrow window of time allotted to
students tasked with returning milk cartons to the cafeteria, and even harder to believe
that he would have committed this crime while a friend and fellow student stood watch
outside the bookroom. To believe Hester‘s confession, one must also accept the farfetched idea that Hester could have committed this horrific crime and returned to class as
if nothing unusual had happened.
Lee Arthur Hester‘s confession to murdering Josephine Keane must have felt like a
bombshell had dropped at Lewis-Champlin and in the Englewood neighborhood where
the school was located. In 1961, there were few, if any, white students left at LewisChamplin. The student body was all black, and the school was grossly overcrowded,
housing approximately 2,600 students in two shifts: a morning shift that ran from 8:00
100

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4.
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Id.
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Id.
104
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 5.
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Id.
108
Id. at 6.
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Id.
110
Id.
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How Science, Police Solved School Killing, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1961, at 1.
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a.m. to noon and an afternoon shift that ran from noon to 4 p.m.112 The school‘s principal
and most of its administrative and engineering staff113 were white, its faculty was slightly
more black than white, and its janitorial staff was all black.
Mrs. Keane's death led school administrators to tighten security at Lewis-Champlin
and other schools in the Chicago public school system. A permanent police guard was
assigned to the school, and School Superintendent Benjamin C. Willis announced a
policy of periodic searches of students for weapons.114 By the year‘s end, many of the
remaining white teachers, afraid that the school was no longer safe for them, had put in
for transfers.115
VI.

¶39

¶40

HESTER‘S LAWYERS

Despite his family‘s meager resources, Hester was able to secure private attorneys
to represent him in his criminal case. His attorneys were three young lawyers: Jerome
Feldman, Marshall Kaplan, and Edward Kaplan, Marshall‘s twin brother. Of the three,
Feldman had the most criminal law experience, having defended soldiers in court martial
proceedings while serving in the armed forces, but all were relative novices to the rough
and tumble world of the criminal court building at 26th and California.116
Feldman joined the law firm of Kaufman, Feldman, Berg, and Cohen upon leaving
the service.117 Several nights a week, Feldman went to his Uncle Dave‘s real estate
office at 63rd Street in Englewood to interview potential new clients.118 It was during
one of those trips in the late 1950s that he met Hester, who waited outside of Feldman‘s
office and offered to shine Feldman‘s shoes.119 Feldman took a liking to the boy, invited
him inside, and a bond developed between the two.120 Feldman served as a mentor to
Hester, helping him with his homework.121 In this capacity, Feldman had corresponded
with Mrs. Keane and knew both of her desire to help Hester and of the respect that Hester
had for her.122 When Hester‘s mother called Feldman and told him that her son had been
charged with Josephine Keane‘s rape and murder, he knew that a mistake had been

112

Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 2312; see also Ben Holman, Violence is No Stranger at
Englewood Death Scene, CHI. AM., Apr. 21, 1961.
113
The engineer staff was an exclusive, almost all-white club filled with many veterans who had returned
from fighting in World Wars I and II. Interview with Joyce Clark, former eighth grade teacher, LewisChamplin School, (Mar. 8, 2010) (on file with author). The job was highly coveted and was often passed
down from father to son. Id. The Chief Engineer was paid more than the principal and, in some respects,
had more power than the principal, able to override the principal when it came to decisions concerning
whether to open or close the school. Id.
114
Teacher Slaying Brings Full Time Guard, CHI. AM., May 1, 1961; see also School Board Defends Right
to Search Pupils, CHI. DEFENDER, May 4, 1961.
115
Interview with Joyce Clark, supra note 113.
116
Affidavit of Jerome Feldman, Attorney at Law, Mar. 28, 2011(on file with author).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
122
Id.

373

N O R T H W E S T E R N J O U R N A L O F L A W A N D S O C I A L P O L IC Y

¶41

¶42

made.123 Without hesitation, he agreed to take the case and enlisted the assistance of the
Kaplans, whom he knew from high school.124
What Feldman and the Kaplans lacked in experience they made up for with their
passion in defending a client they believed to be innocent. Feldman and Marshall Kaplan
fanned out into the community shortly after the murders and attempted to interview every
teacher and every student who may have possessed information about the case. 125 In the
summer of 1961, the legal team interviewed dozens of potential witnesses, usually after
hours or on the weekends, as the men had law practices they were trying to sustain during
regular working hours.126 It was grueling work and the men had many doors slammed in
their faces, particularly when they tried to interview white teachers and administrators.127
The trio filed many pre-trial motions in the Hester case throughout the summer
months, but by far the most important one was Hester‘s motion to suppress his
confession. Given the power of confession evidence to a jury—even a confession as
ridiculous as Hester‘s—Hester would have little chance of being acquitted if his
confession was admitted into evidence.128
VII.

¶43

[2011

HESTER‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION

The hearing on Hester‘s motion to suppress his confession commenced in
September of 1961.129 The evidence established that Lee Arthur Hester was fourteen
years and five days of age at the time of his arrest.130 He was in the fifth grade.131 The
most recent psychological testing—two years old—of Hester by the Chicago Public
Schools placed Hester‘s I.Q. at eighty-two. He was at least four grade levels behind in
math and five in reading and spelling.132 He was taken into police custody at around 8:00
a.m. on April 21, 1961, and remained in police custody until approximately 8:30 p.m—
twelve and a half hours later—when he finished signing a confession that had been typed
up by a court reporter and reviewed with him by a Cook County State‘s Attorney. 133 He

123

Id.
Id. The lead prosecutor in the case of People of the State of Illinois v. Hester was John J. Stamos, one of
the most experienced and talented attorneys in the Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s Office. See Adolph J.
Slaughter, Why Hester „Blew Up‟, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 7, 1961, at 1. Stamos later became the Chief
Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court. John J. Stamos, THE THIRD BRANCH: A CHRONICLE OF THE ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT, http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/JusticeArchive/Bio_Stamos.asp.
125
Affidavit of Jerome Feldman, supra note 116.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., perhaps more than any other Justice,
recognized the unique power of confession evidence to tilt ―the balance against the defendant in the
adversarial process‖ of a trial, writing that ―the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a
trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when the confession is
obtained.‖ Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d. ed. 1972).
129
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 283.
130
Id. at 21–22.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 24.
133
Id. at 25–37.
124
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had no attorney or parent with him during the time he was in custody and was not advised
of his right to an attorney or to counsel.134
Many other facts were in sharp dispute. According to Hester, he was the victim of
a classic good cop, bad cop routine. The white officers, Sergeants John Killackey and
William Keating, played the bad cops, accusing him of lying, screaming at him, pointing
a pen in his face, and getting so close to him that their spit flew into his face.135
Meanwhile, the black officers, Robert Perkins and Harold Thomas, played the role of
good cops, telling Hester that the white cops were ready to throw his head through the
wall and that they would make sure the white cops would not bother him anymore.136
The black officers told him that he could go home if he said he did it.137 They also told
Hester, who was still in a white hospital-like gown and slippers, that they would go to his
house, get his clothes, and bring his mother to take him home.138
In addition to threats and promises, the officers used evidence ploys. The two
black officers told him that his blood was found on Mrs. Keane‘s clothes and that they
found her hair on his sweater, and one of the white officers told him that they found his
fingerprints on the icebox.139 Hester said that before he confessed, the officers showed
him numerous crime scene photos, including pictures of Mrs. Keane lying in a pool of
her own blood.140 When he finally broke, he made up a story from details he had seen in
the pictures and by agreeing to leading questions from the officers.141 Before the
Assistant State‘s Attorney came in to take his confession, the black officers rehearsed the
details with him five or six times.142 Hester also testified that he asked to see his ―mama‖
at least three times while in police custody and that his requests were denied.143
Of course, the detectives and youth officers recalled the interrogation very
differently. Their account was that although Hester at first denied killing Mrs. Keane
during the interrogation at 4 p.m., when confronted with the Crime Lab‘s findings, he
confessed, suggesting that he stabbed her by accident.144 He then provided a detailed
statement to Officers Perkins and Thomas.145 Only after Hester provided the details did
the officers show him crime scene photos to ―clear up a few points.‖146 The whole
interrogation lasted no more than fifteen minutes and contained no threats or promises.147
On September 19, 1961, Judge Alexander J. Napoli heard oral arguments on
Hester‘s motion to suppress, allotting each side no more than thirty minutes. Hester‘s
attorney, Marshall Kaplan, took well over an hour.148 Kaplan brought an unusual
perspective to his argument. He had previously defended accused American prisoners of
134

Id. at 48.
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 486–88, 609–10.
136
Id. at 486; Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 2377.
137
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 487,
138
Id. at 524–25, Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 2377.
139
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 2377–2388.
140
Id. at 2378.
141
Id.
142
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 607.
143
Id. at 521.
144
Id., at 782–83.
145
Id., at 779–93.
146
Id. at 788–90.
147
Id. at. 331–32.
148
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 1053.
135
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war who were tried for collaborating with the Chinese communists in a North Korean
prison camp. These prisoners confessed only after holding out for as long as three
years.149
Kaplan‘s argument was fascinating on many levels. He did his best to argue the
facts and the applicable law, but he also asked Judge Napoli to think about what the law
should be and what the law likely would be in the near future. Such aspirational
arguments were not likely to persuade Judge Napoli, a career prosecutor150 before
becoming a judge, to rule in Hester‘s favor, but Kaplan was not deterred:
I submit that you reach a point in the law that the age of the defendant, his
educational abilities, his mental capacity, his attainment in school, his
family background . . . when those facts are looked at, that it then becomes
not only factual but a rule of law requiring the State to furnish him, if at
least not his parents, a lawyer, someone to look after his rights and his
obligations, whatever has gone before, whatever will go after, there must
be somebody to protect his rights.151

¶49

Interpreting the United States Supreme Court‘s decisions on confessions, Kaplan
predicted that it was only a matter of time before the Court would hold that the absence
of counsel during police interrogations would be the decisive factor in admitting or
suppressing confessions, and urged Judge Napoli to get ahead of the curve:
They [the Supreme Court] have never, I will admit, determined a
confession case on the supplying or not supplying of counsel, but they
have mentioned it so often that I venture to say that in the not too distant
future it will be one of the prime bases for striking a confession, if not
already the prime basis.152

¶50

Although the truth or falsity of the confession was an issue for the jury to decide,
Kaplan asked the court to look at the unreliability of Hester‘s confession and to create a
rule requiring that where a confession is, on its face, obviously untrue, law enforcement
must continue to investigate the crime at hand:
I ask you to lay down a rule [of law]…that where facts in a statement, be it
oral or written, are indicated to investigating officials, be they policeman,
juvenile officers or State‘s attorneys, where those facts are so abominably
ridiculous and so absolutely inconceivable that it cannot term the
document, although it is signed, a confession, and that they have a duty to
go further.153
149

Id. at 1033.
Judge Alexander J. Napoli was an Assistant State‘s Attorney from 1933 to 1950. Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (enter ―Napoli,
Alexander‖ in search box; follow ―Napoli, Alexander J.‖ hyperlink).
151
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 1030.
152
Id. at 1050.
153
Id. at 1051. Richard Leo, Peter Neufeld, Bradley Hall, Amy Shavell, and I made a similar argument
forty-five years later when we called for courts to hold pre-trial reliability hearings in cases involving
150
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Kaplan ended his argument by telling the court, in no uncertain terms, that Hester
was innocent, that the State knew it, and that he would fight to prove Hester‘s innocence,
no matter how long it took: ―They know he didn‘t kill that teacher . . . [a]nd if I have to
spend the rest of my life doing it and giving up my law practice I‘ll prove it.‖154
Despite Marshall Kaplan‘s best efforts, Judge Napoli denied Hester‘s motion to
suppress. Siding with the officers, Judge Napoli found Hester‘s claims of being kicked,
spit on, and threatened, to be unbelievable.155 He held that ―there was no prolonged
questioning‖ or coercion of any kind during the interrogation.156 Further, Judge Napoli
held that the interrogation lasted only five or ten minutes and that Hester started making
admissions shortly after the officers informed him of the crime lab‘s findings.157
Despite the best efforts of Feldman and the Kaplans,158 in October 1961, a Cook
County jury convicted Hester of the murder and sexual assault of Mrs. Keane.159
Although it is unlikely that Hester would have prevailed anyway, in light of the weight
given to confession evidence by jurors, Hester‘s defense was hamstrung by several
rulings of the trial court, particularly the court‘s refusal to allow a defense psychiatric
expert to testify concerning Lee Arthur‘s personality and why his character traits made
him especially vulnerable to authority figures and susceptible to psychological
coercion.160 The same jury that convicted Hester sentenced him to fifty-five years in
prison. Before the year would end, the boy, still only fourteen years of age, was sent to
Pontiac Correctional facility, a maximum-security facility for adult criminal offenders, to
serve out his sentence.161
confessions in addition to hearings on the voluntariness of confessions. See Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing
Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 479 (2006).
154
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. I, supra note 95, at 1061.
155
Id. at 1067–71
156
Id. at 1067–68
157
Id. at 1069.
158
Hester‘s trial was a highly contested affair which involved a battle of the experts with regard to the
physical and scientific evidence in the case and a swearing contest between Hester and the interrogating
officers with regard to the confession. It makes for fascinating reading, but a full discussion of the trial is
beyond the scope of this Article, which is focused on the interrogation and confession-related issues and the
import of Hester‘s case on the law relating to interrogations and confessions of children.
159
Bill of Exceptions, Vol. II, supra note 95, at 3136–38.
160
See Hester‘s State Supreme Court Brief, supra note 93, at 99–105.
161
Hester‘s trial was also a cauldron of racial tension which boiled over at times. On one occasion, Hester
exploded, breaking away from his guards, and high-jumping over a bench so that he could talk with his
sister who was sitting in the gallery. He was eventually restrained by prosecutors and detectives, but he
managed to get in his licks first, kicking one prosecutor, punching Sergeant William Keating in the face,
and kicking Detective Sheldon Teller, before being held under control. In the midst of this fury, Hester
threatened to kill everyone and blow up the building unless he was allowed to see his sister. Adolph
Slaughter, a reporter for the Chicago Defender, described the pressure in the courtroom as follows:
Although whites and Negroes sit side by side in the courtroom which is nearly always
filled with spectators, it is impossible to ignore the rank overtones of racism and the
sometimes audible expressions of Negroes who feel the boy is being ―railroaded‖. . . .
Whites, on the other hand, have openly expressed hatred for the boy whose courtroom
conduct, even before Wednesday, has lent fuel to this hatred . . . . Who is responsible for
these set of circumstances which have made this case much more than a trial of a 14year-old boy accused of stabbing his school teacher? It is really difficult to say or even to
place the blame on a single individual. There can be little doubt, however, that the
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Hester‘s attorneys were stunned by the verdict. Feldman was quoted as saying that
―[t]he verdict isn‘t as important as the feeling you have when you know your client is
innocent and 12 persons still have found him guilty.‖162 ―Lee Arthur Hester did not kill
Jo Keane,‖ said Edward Kaplan, ―and I believe this now as strongly as I did during the
trial.‖163 Kaplan went on to explain how the jury could have convicted an innocent boy
and how Hester could have confessed to a crime he did not commit:
The indicia of guilt that a confession gives many times magnifies all the
other evidence all out of proportion. . . . That which you might not
otherwise believe becomes believable when you have a confession. . . .
[T]he fact that those people [the jurors] could not be induced to admit
things they were not guilty of would prevent them from understanding that
a boy of the low mentality of Lee Arthur Hester could very well admit to
things he did not do. . . . Hester has no concept of the social stigma that
would attach to his admitting guilt to a crime he was not guilty of. The
fact that all he had to do was admit guilt and he could go home was
paramount in his mind. . . . In Hester‘s mind, his reasoning is, ―if I didn‘t
do it and admit that I did, certainly they will discover I didn‘t do it and let
me go home.‖164

¶55

Hester‘s lawyers expected that the appeal would take at least a year, but they
vowed to take the case to the United States Supreme Court, if necessary.165
VIII.

¶56

THE APPEALS

Hester‘s attorneys were overly optimistic to think that the appeal would take only a
year. It would take nearly seven years for the Illinois Supreme Court to rule on Hester‘s
appeal. Part of the delay can be attributed to the size of the record. The record in the
Hester case was massive. Comprising 3,228 transcript pages, it took court reporters, in
the days before word processors, approximately four years to complete.166 Once the
record was complete, additional time was granted for Hester‘s attorneys to prepare and
file Hester‘s brief. The attorneys raised eighteen issues in their mammoth brief, which

attitude of the State, as expressed by Stamos who is also Chief of the Criminal Division,
is one contributing factor. Said Stamos: ‗Trial is war. If I don‘t annihilate them, they‘ll
annihilate me.‘
Slaughter, supra note 124, at 1.
162
Teacher Killer Convicted, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 21, 1961, at 1.
163
Adolph J. Slaughter, Lawyers Stand by Hester; Map Appeal, CHI. DEFENDER (Nat‘l ed.), Oct. 14, 1961.
164
Id. Kaplan‘s theories about why confession evidence is so powerful, why juries are so easily swayed by
it, and why juveniles are more likely to falsely confess, were right on target and well ahead of his time.
Numerous psychological studies have since verified Kaplan‘s opinions. See, e.g., Saul Kassin et al, Police
Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 9, 19–20, 23 (2010).
165
Slaughter, supra note 163.
166
See The Complete Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: A Retrospective 1969
through 1979 Term, Lee Arthur Hester v. State of Illinois, No. 82, Nov. 18, 1969, at 1 [hereinafter
Transcript of Oral Argument] (on file with author).
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totaled a whopping 238 pages.167 The State received extra time to file its brief and
submitted its 64-page reply on December 29, 1967.168
At the dawn of 1968, Hester‘s attorneys had to like their chances at prevailing on
appeal. Between 1961 and 1968, the United States Supreme Court issued both Escobedo
(a case that originated in Chicago) and Miranda, two decisions that underscored the
importance of the role of counsel for suspects at the pre-trial stages of proceedings.
Furthermore, the ink was still drying on Gault, which raised questions about the ability of
juveniles to waive their rights to counsel and silence and to be adequately protected
against self-incrimination in the absence of counsel.169 Given these powerful new
precedents, the delays in the filing of the briefs seemed only to increase Hester‘s chances
of success, if not in the Illinois Supreme Court, then certainly in the United States
Supreme Court.
Hester‘s arguments with respect to the admissibility of his confession took up a
full thirty pages of the brief. The entire argument in the brief was summarized in the
lengthy heading to this section:
It was violative of both the United States and Illinois constitutions to
admit into evidence the purported oral and written confessions of the
defendant over timely defense objections thereto because these purported
confessions were coerced from the defendant by psychological coercion
and by threats of physical brutality, the defendant being a fourteen year
old boy of limited mentality who was kept incommunicado for over
twelve hours before signing a written confession, who was not furnished
legal counsel, who was not advised of any of his constitutional rights (nor
capable of understanding same), including the right to silence and to
counsel, and who, in addition, after repeatedly requesting to see his
mother, was refused the right to see her or any other friend before and
during his interrogations.170

¶59

Beginning with Haley and Gallegos, Hester‘s counsel argued that Hester‘s claim
that his confession was involuntary was as strong as, if not stronger than, those of the
defendants in those cases. At times, Hester‘s counsel sought greater relief than a factspecific determination that his confession was involuntary, arguing for a per se rule that
every confession taken from a youthful suspect in the absence of counsel or another adult
friend, must be suppressed: ―There is therefore no doubt that where a defendant is as
young as Hester is, the rule of law to be applied (without regard to the requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona) is that irrespective of the pressure applied to bend the will, failure to
provide counsel (or some other friend) will render a confession taken during secret
167

Hester‘s State Supreme Court Brief, supra note 93.
State‘s Illinois Supreme Court Brief, supra note 95.
169
Although the United States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), held that
neither Escobedo nor Miranda could be applied retroactively, the fact that Hester was interrogated by
police without counsel and was never warned of his constitutional rights, coupled with the fact that he also
did not have a parent with him during the interrogation preceding his confession, were facts that would
have been considered important evidence by the Warren Court in assessing the voluntariness of Hester‘s
confession.
170
Hester‘s State Supreme Court Brief, supra note 93, at 62.
168
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detention of one so young inadmissible.‖171 This section of Hester‘s brief closed with a
rhetorical flourish, arguing that ―[w]ithout counsel, without friend, and without
safeguarding his constitutional rights,‖ Hester was no match for his interrogators: ―[H]e
was like clay in the hands of a sculptor.‖172 Such interrogation practices, argued Hester‘s
attorneys, had ―no place in this age of enlightenment.‖173
Given the size of Hester‘s brief and the many issues it raised, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled relatively quickly. On March 28, 1968, the Court affirmed Hester‘s
conviction, siding with the police on every fact that Hester disputed, including whether
Officer Prunckle kicked Hester, whether the officers threatened Hester, whether Officer
Perkins showed Hester crime scene photographs before his confession, and whether he
asked to see his mother. On this last point, the Court found it ―highly relevant‖ that
Officers Perkins and Thomas went to Mrs. Hester‘s home at 2:45 p.m. on the day Hester
was taken into custody. The officers told Mrs. Hester that her son was being held by the
police, and Mrs. Hester did not try to find her son until 6:00 p.m., after he had already
confessed.174 Although the Court acknowledged Hester‘s youth and mental limitations, it
held that these factors, in the absence of a showing of coercion, did not render Hester‘s
confession involuntary.175
One justice filed a dissenting opinion.176 That justice, however, Walter V.
Schaefer, was one of the most highly respected state supreme court justices in the United
States.177
Justice Schaefer was appointed to the Illinois Supreme Court by Governor Adlai E.
Stevenson in 1951 to fill a vacancy.178 He was elected in 1951, again in 1960, and was
retained in 1970.179 During his tenure on the Court, Justice Schaefer served as Chief
Justice on two occasions.180 Schaefer was widely recognized as one of the most
outstanding state supreme court judges ever to take the bench.181 Indeed, in the United
States Supreme Court‘s landmark Miranda decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren cited
Schaefer‘s scholarship in his majority opinion and called Schaefer ―one of our country‘s
distinguished jurists.‖182
In April 1966, on the eve of Miranda, Justice Schaefer delivered the Julius
Rosenthal Foundation lecture at the Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago,
where he served for many years as a professor.183 His lectures were later published as a
171

Id. at 82.
Id.
173
Id. at 91.
174
People v. Hester, 237 N.E.2d 466, 499 (Ill. 1968).
175
Id. at 598.
176
Hester, 237 N.E.2d at 518.
177
In 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson sought to appoint his close friend and advisor Abe Fortas to
the United States Supreme Court, Fortas, who did not want to leave his lucrative law practice, initially
rebuffed the President. In his place, Fortas suggested that Johnson nominate Walter Schaefer to the Court.
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 177 (1988).
178
Walter Vincent Schaefer, Jurist, Lawyer, Scholar, Teacher 1904-1986, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1151
(1986).
179
See id. at 1152.
180
Id. at 1143.
181
Id. at 1144.
182
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 n.50 (1966).
183
Schaefer, supra note 178, at 1143.
172
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book in 1967 entitled The Suspect and Society: Criminal Procedure and Converging
Constitutional Doctrines.184 In The Suspect and Society, Justice Schaefer voiced his
concern that ―the doctrines converging upon the institution of police interrogation are
threatening to push on to their logical conclusion—to the point where no questioning of
suspects will be permitted.‖185 He was particularly concerned that Escobedo, which
appeared to forbid interrogation in the absence of counsel, would be the end of
interrogation.186
Justice Schaefer favored a more balanced, legislative approach, one that he and his
colleagues at the American Law Institute (ALI) devised. According to the ALI Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, suspects did not have a right to counsel during the
first four hours of detention, but the suspect‘s attorney could be present if the suspect had
an attorney.187 However, once the four-hour detention period ended, continued
interrogation of suspects was prohibited except with the permission of counsel.188 To
ensure that an adequate record of the initial four-hour period was made, and that the
question of what happened during the interrogation did not devolve into a swearing
contest between suspect and police officer, the Code required that the questioning be
tape-recorded.189 The fact that Justice Schaefer did not fully embrace the leanings of the
Warren Court to grant suspects the right to counsel in the stationhouse meant that his
dissent would carry even greater weight with the Court when Hester sought certiorari
review. Schaefer‘s dissent was a straightforward application of the ―totality of
circumstances‖ voluntariness test, but he came to a different result from that of his
colleagues.190 The fact that the police held Hester, a fourteen-year-old with the mind of
an eleven-year-old, in police custody for over twelve hours without ever telling him that
he was under arrest or advising him of his rights, led Justice Schaefer to conclude that the
State failed to prove that Hester‘s confession was voluntary.191 Schaefer also quarreled
with the majority‘s insinuation that Mrs. Hester was less than diligent in trying to locate
Lee Arthur.192 He found no support for the majority‘s finding that she waited until 6 p.m.
to try to find her son but did find that the State used repeated and frivolous objections to
prevent Mrs. Hester from telling her side of the story.193 These facts led Justice Schaefer
to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that Hester‘s
confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.194
184

WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES (1967).
185
Id. at 9.
186
Id. at 23.
187
Id. at 50.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 52.
190
See People v. Hester, 237 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. 1968).
191
Id. at 484.
192
Id. at 483.
193
Id. at 518–20.
194
Id. at 520. There is reason to believe that had Ellen Hester, Lee Arthur‘s mother, been allowed to
answer these questions she would have described being given the runaround by the police when she tried to
locate Lee Arthur. In an article in the Chicago Daily News shortly after Hester‘s arrest, Mrs. Hester in
words ―tinged with bewilderment—and anger,‖ stated: ―I just don‘t like the way they took my boy without
letting me know about it . . . and not letting me see him.‖ Slain Woman His Favorite Teacher: Mother
Refuses to Believe Her Son Committed Crime, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1961, at 3.
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HESTER‘S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Hester‘s attorneys filed a motion to reconsider before the Illinois Supreme Court
that was quickly denied. This paved the way for the attorneys to seek certiorari review in
the United States Supreme Court. On August 14, 1968,195 Hester filed his petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Court. Although Hester raised several issues in his cert
petition, the lead issue was framed as follows:
Can the petitioner‘s conviction stand where the petitioner‘s conviction is
based in whole or in part on the secret incommunicado taking, during a
period of unlawful detention, of the oral and written confessions of a 14
year old Negro boy in the fifth grade of grammar school, with severely
limited intelligence, without counsel, parent or anyone else standing in
loco parentis to him, without adherence to any of his constitutional rights
or knowledge of the same and under conditions more fully described
herein in the statement of facts material to this case?196

¶66

Clearly relying on the fact that the Court would give great deference to the dissent
of Justice Schaefer, Hester‘s attorneys cited Justice Schaefer in the opening and closing
paragraphs of the argument section, and several times in between.197 The State filed its
response on January 20, 1969.198 On April 7, 1969, John Clark, Clerk of the United
States Supreme Court, sent Western Union telegrams to counsel for both parties,
notifying them that the Court had granted Hester‘s writ of certiorari.199
X.

¶67

EVENTS BEYOND HESTER‘S CONTROL DAMAGE HESTER‘S CHANCES OF SUCCESS

The period between the time that Hester‘s appeal was denied by the Illinois
Supreme Court (March 28, 1968) and the time the Court granted Hester‘s cert petition
(April 7, 1969) was one of the most turbulent times in the history of the United States.
195

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hester v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 660 (1969) (No. 82) (on file with author).
Id. at 2. The petition for certiorari raised other weighty issues that merited the United States Supreme
Court‘s attention, including whether the police had probable cause to arrest Hester at the school and
whether Hester‘s right to a present a defense was compromised when he was precluded from calling an
expert to testify about his personality characteristics which rendered him particularly susceptible to
coercion. Id. at 14–16, 18–22. These issues, however, were not taken up by Justice Schaefer and were,
appropriately, given less primacy in the petition.
197
Id. at 9–11, 22. In an opinion which predated both Miranda and Hester, Justice Schaefer, again in
dissent, held that a fifteen-year-old was entitled to be notified of his right to counsel as soon as the State
brought an attorney in to take his confession:
Whatever may have been the situation during his interrogation by police officers, this
defendant‘s right to counsel certainly attached when the prosecution found it necessary to
use an attorney in questioning him. At least at that point he was entitled to be told that he
need not answer questions, and to be advised of his right to counsel.
People v. Richardson, 207 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Ill. 1965). The Richardson opinion is an example of Justice
Schaefer‘s effort, in the immediate aftermath of Escobedo, to find a compromise that would both respect
the need of the police to interrogate suspects to solve cases (a view that he shared), and the need to provide
greater protections to suspects from police overreaching during interrogations.
198
Response in Opposition, Jan. 20, 1969 (on file with author).
199
See Western Union Telegram from Clerk of the United States Supreme Court to Marshall Kaplan (Apr.
7, 1969) (on file with author).
196
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On March 31, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson stunned the world when he announced
that he would not seek the nomination of the Democratic Party for President of the
United States.200 Johnson‘s announcement came at the end of a speech concerning the
war in Vietnam, a war in which American casualties were mounting and an American
victory seemed uncertain after the North Vietnamese‘s successful Tet Offensive in
January 1968.201 That same week, on April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King was
assassinated, causing blacks in cities across the country to take to the streets and riot.202
On June 5, 1968, Robert Kennedy, brother of assassinated former President John F.
Kennedy, and the leading Democratic candidate for President, was assassinated at a rally
after his victory in the California primary.203 And in August of 1968, students and antiwar protestors clashed violently with Chicago police on the streets as the Democrats
gathered for their convention to elect a nominee for President.204
In the midst of this chaos, the Republican Party, led by their leading candidate,
Richard M. Nixon, made ―law and order‖ the centerpiece of their platform.205 Opposition
to the Warren Court was one of Nixon‘s central campaign themes.206 The United States
Supreme Court was not oblivious to the chaos in the streets and the public‘s shifting
sensibilities against criminal defendants and in favor of law enforcement. The Miranda
decision in particular was a lightning rod, prompting predictions from law enforcement
officers that the decision would embolden criminals and compromise public safety.207 In
the midst of such instability, it is hard to predict with certainty how the Warren Court
acting at full strength would have ruled in Hester‘s case. But Hester would never get the
chance to see the full Warren Court decide his case. By the time his case was argued in
front of the Court, seismic events transpired that changed the makeup of the court and
almost certainly assured that Hester would not win his case.
XI.

¶69

Steven A. Drizin

A JUSTICE IS FORCED TO RESIGN IN DISGRACE AND A NEW CHIEF JUSTICE IS
APPOINTED TO REPLACE THE RETIRING EARL WARREN

In June of 1968, President Johnson was a lame-duck President with diminishing
political capital on the Hill. But he didn‘t see it that way. When Chief Justice Earl
Warren told the President that he wanted to resign, Johnson, against the advice of Clark
200

Lyndon B. Johnson, President, United States, Address to the Nation (Mar. 31, 1968), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680331.asp (announcing steps to limit
the war in Vietnam and reporting his decision not to seek reelection).
201
Tom Wicker, Johnson Says He Won‟t Run, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1968.
202
Ben A. Franklin, Army Troops in Capital as Negroes Riot; Guard Sent Into Chicago, Detroit, Boston,
N.Y. TIMES, APR. 6, 1968.
203
Gladwin Hill, Kennedy is Dead, Victim of Assassin, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1968.
204
J. Anthony Lukass, Police Battle Demonstrators in Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1968.
205
Erwin Chemerinsky, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 16 (2010).
206
In his acceptance speech at the 1968 Republican National Convention, Richard M. Nixon made no
attempt to hide his disdain for the Warren Court‘s criminal procedure decisions: ―let us also recognize that
some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the
criminal forces in this country.‖ Transcripts of Acceptance Speeches by Nixon and Agnew to the G.O.P.
Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1968, at 20; see also The Campaign: Crime Control, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1968, at 46.
207
Fred P. Graham, How to Make Sure a Confession Stands Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 26, 1967, at E12; Donald
Jansen, New Group Fights Curbs on Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1967, at 68; Irving R. Kaufman, Miranda
and the Police: The Confession Debate Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1966.
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Clifford, one of his closest advisors, decided to exercise his remaining capital to honor
two old friends with nominations to the United States Supreme Court. He nominated
Associate Justice Abe Fortas, one of his closest confidantes, to replace Warren as Chief
Justice, and nominated federal judge and Johnson‘s former congressional colleague,
Homer Thornberry, to replace Fortas as Associate Justice.208 Johnson‘s decision set in
motion a course of events that he could not possibly have anticipated. What started as a
way to honor his loyal friend ended up in Fortas‘s resignation from the Court in disgrace.
Throughout the summer of 1968, Fortas‘s nomination was debated before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Fortas was grilled relentlessly about his close relationship
with President Johnson, especially his continued service to the President as a trusted
advisor after he was appointed an Associate Justice of the Court.209 The Senators on the
Committee were stunned to learn, for example, that Fortas helped draft Johnson‘s State of
the Union address and consulted with him on the most pressing issues of the day,
including the Vietnam War, while he was sitting on the Court.210 They also questioned
Fortas about his judicial philosophy and the decisions of the Warren Court, particularly
Fortas‘s decisions to expand the rights of criminal defendants. As the summer turned to
fall, it became apparent that Fortas would not be confirmed in time to sit as Chief Justice
when the Court began its October term. With his supporters unable to break a Senate
filibuster over his nomination, Fortas asked Johnson to withdraw his name for the
nomination as Chief Justice.211
More bad news came for Fortas just seven months later. During his confirmation
hearings for the position of Chief Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee had received
an anonymous letter suggesting that the Committee look into the relationship between
Fortas and a suspected stock manipulator named Louis Wolfson.212 Although the
Committee did not pursue the tip, a reporter for Life magazine did, and on May 5, 1969,
William Lambert‘s exposé hit newsstands.213 Lambert‘s story raised concerns about
Fortas‘s ethics, specifically his decision to accept a $20,000 payment from Wolfson‘s
family foundation. Fortas received a check for $20,000 from the foundation in January
1966, ostensibly to serve as an advisor to the foundation on charitable, educational, and
civil rights projects. Although Fortas returned the check without cashing it, he waited
until December 1966, after Wolfson was indicted, to do so. By the time the Life article
was published, Wolfson was in prison.214
The Nixon administration met with Lambert nearly a month prior to the release of
his article. After Lambert‘s article hit the stands, the Justice Department opened its own
investigation into Fortas‘s dealings with Wolfson and subpoenaed all correspondence
208

Fred. P. Graham, Johnson and the Court: Two Appointments that Don‟t Please Everybody, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1968, at E1. Clark Clifford was shocked when consulted about the decision, telling the President
that had the President nominated the two men before March, he could have succeeded, but ―you‘re never
going to get it through‖ now when the Republicans are planning to take over the White House. LAURA
KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 326–27 (1990).
209
Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Abe Fortas Dies at 71: Shaped Historic Rulings on Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1982, at A1.
210
Marjorie Hunter, Griffin Rebukes Nixon for Stand Opposing a Filibuster on Fortas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1968.
211
Id.; see also Fred P. Graham, The Votes Are Not There for Fortas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1968, at E7.
212
KALMAN, supra note 208, at 360.
213
William Lambert, Fortas of the Supreme Court: A Question of Ethics, LIFE, May 9, 1969, at 32.
214
KALMAN, supra note 208, at 366–70.
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between Fortas and Wolfson from the Foundation.215 Among the documents, was a
contract that specified not only that Fortas was to receive a one-time payment of $20,000,
but also that the Foundation agreed to pay Fortas $20,000 a year for life and to his wife if
she survived him. With talk that Congress might institute impeachment proceedings, and
Fortas losing support from many of his brethren on the Court, including Chief Justice
Warren, Fortas resigned from the bench on May 15, 1969.216
Hester‘s chances were dealt another blow when President Nixon nominated federal
appeals court Judge Warren E. Burger to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Burger, who was known to be less than enamored with the Warren Court‘s expansion of
procedural rights for defendants, was quickly confirmed in June 1969.217 When the Court
opened its fall term on the first Monday of October 1969, Fortas‘s seat had not yet been
filled, leaving a court of only eight members. More importantly, Hester had lost two
likely allies in Warren and Fortas.
XII.

¶74

¶75
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HESTER‘S BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT

Hester‘s attorneys were knee-deep in preparing their brief for the Court when the
events involving Justices Fortas, Warren, and Burger were playing out in the national
arena. In many ways, the brief was written with an eye to Justice Fortas. Although the
lead argument in the brief was a traditional application of the due process voluntariness
test, relying heavily upon Haley, Gallegos, Gault, and Justice Schaefer‘s dissent, Hester‘s
attorneys went much further, perhaps too far in retrospect. Building upon Justice Fortas‘s
language in Gault that ―authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the
reliability and trustworthiness of ‗confessions‘ by children,‖ Hester‘s attorneys boldly
asked the Court that ―the talking [sic] of confessions from children . . . be abolished,‖ at
least to the extent that such confessions can be used against them in criminal court
proceedings.218 Such sweeping arguments might have appealed to a majority of the
Warren Court, but were unlikely to capture a majority of the Burger Court.
In their brief, Hester‘s attorneys undertook the burden of showing not only that
Hester‘s confession was unreliable, but also that he was actually innocent of the crime.219
They asked the Court to undertake a de novo review of the entire record and
systematically deconstructed Hester‘s confession by showing that it was not corroborated
by the physical evidence in the case and that it was inconsistent with the actual facts of
the murder.220
215

Fred P. Graham, Aim is to Avert Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1969, at 1.
KALMAN, supra note 208, at 366–70.
217
Fred P. Graham, Warren Court Era Ending Today After 16 Years of Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1969,
at 1, 24 (noting that President Nixon ―made a point of selecting a Chief Justice who rejects much of what
the Warren Court has done on the subject of defendant‘s rights.‖).
218
Brief of Petitioner, Hester v. Illinois, 90 S. Ct. 1408 (No. 82) (1969), 1969 WL 119867, at *42–*48.
219
Id. at *53.
220
Id. at *53–*74. In hindsight, the case against Hester was very weak and bore many of the indicia of
false confessions. Hester‘s confession did not lead the police to such critical pieces of corroborative
evidence as the knife used to kill Mrs. Keane or the keys used to lock her door. Id. at *71. Hester‘s
confession also contained numerous errors, including the number of times that Mrs. Keane was stabbed,
that he was wearing his jacket during the time of the murder, and that he did not ejaculate inside the victim.
Id. at *64–*75; see Richard A. Leo et al, Bringing Reliability Back In, supra note 153, at 521–35
216
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Oral argument in the case took place on November 18, 1969. 221 Marshall Kaplan
argued the case for Hester.222 Joel M. Flaum of the Illinois Attorney General‘s Office
represented the State of Illinois.223 Kaplan argued that the confession must fail in three
ways: First, a traditional application of the voluntariness test must result in suppression of
Hester‘s confession. Kaplan started out his argument with a highly detailed recitation of
the facts, focusing on the circumstances of the arrest, interrogation, and confession of
Hester. Kaplan listed each of the factors that should lead the Court to find the confession
involuntary, focusing on the length of time Hester was in custody, his age, lack of
experience, illiteracy, and low I.Q.; that no fewer than seven Chicago police officers
participated in his arrest and interrogation; that the two Negro officers told him that the
white detectives were going to throw his head through the wall unless he told them what
they wanted to hear; that the officers showed him numerous pictures that enabled him to
concoct a story of what happened; and that the statement was rehearsed multiple times
before a written confession was commenced.224 Summing up the first argument, Kaplan
said: ―Under conventional principles of due process, forgetting the retroactivity of
Miranda or Escobedo or the lack thereof . . . you cannot take a confession from a
fourteen year old of the type I have described, after incommunicado holding of him,
failing to give him even the barest rudiments of representation, and/or having anybody
stand in loco parentis to him.‖225
(discussing ways to distinguish true confessions from false ones). Moreover, two key witnesses gave
Hester an alibi. Sherman Baker, the boy who supposedly waited for Hester at the stairwell while he went
into the bookroom, corroborated Hester‘s account that another boy, Lorenzo Walker, had returned the milk
cartons on the day of the murder with Baker. Id. at *64. So did Hester‘s teacher, Mrs. Webster, who swore
that Hester never left her room to return the cartons. Id. To the extent that Hester did get some of the facts
right, these could have come from leading questions of his interrogators or the crime scene photos showed
to him by the police. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051
(2010) (finding evidence of police fact-feeding in virtually every DNA exoneration involving false
confessions). Although the State‘s expert testified at trial that a spot of blood found on Hester‘s clothing
was the same type as Mrs. Keane‘s, Hester‘s trial expert, the eminent Dr. Alexander Weiner, of the Office
of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City, questioned the methods of the Chicago Crime Lab in
ascertaining the blood type found on Hester‘s clothes. Blood Tests Hit in Murder Trial of Boy, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Oct. 6, 1961, at C10. In any event, approximately fourty percent of the general population shared
Mrs. Keane‘s blood type. The other so-called evidence would never stand up in court today. Microscopic
hair analysis, like that of the hair allegedly found on Hester‘s clothing, is notoriously unreliable and has led
to numerous wrongful convictions. Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert
the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 395–96 (2004). Similarly, the lab expert‘s testimony
that lipstick found on Hester‘s jacket was similar to lipstick found in her purse and that metal filings found
in Hester‘s pockets were similar to those found in the victim‘s underwear would probably not even be
admissible in court today and suffers from the same problems of subjectivity as the hair analysis. Today, if
the evidence still exists, DNA testing might determine with certainty whether the blood or the hairs found
on Hester‘s clothing belonged to Mrs. Keane.
221
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 1.
222
Id.
223
Flaum would later have a distinguished career as a federal prosecutor under United States Attorney
James R. Thompson (who later became Governor of Illinois), and as a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where he still sits today. See Joel Martin Flaum, Federal Judicial Center,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=767&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na .
224
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 3–7; see also Oral Argument, Hester v. Illinois, 397
U.S. 660 (No. 82) (1969), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1969/1969_82/argument.
225
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 7.
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Second, Kaplan argued that, forgetting conventional principles of due process, ―[i]t
is violation of due process‖ to treat juveniles as if they were adults when taking their
statements.226 To underscore this point, Kaplan, building to a crescendo, stated:
And may I point it out: In a golf game we give a handicap, in a bowling
tournament we give pins to a less capable bowler . . . in a horse race we
add weight to the faster horse. I say that even if you were to anoint Lee
Arthur Hester with the finest of oils and place him in a room with a
swimming pool and velvet walls, you cannot take a confession from Lee
Arthur Hester without providing him with some rudiments of due process
and fairness.227

¶78

¶79

Up until this point, over twelve minutes of argument, not a single justice had
interrupted Kaplan. But Kaplan‘s third argument brought some of the justices to life.
Kaplan asked the Court to ―abolish the taking of juvenile confessions because there is no
possible way [that] someone like Lee Arthur Hester can adequately be advised of his
rights. Advising Lee Arthur Hester of his rights, is like, is like advising a deaf man of his
rights.‖228 Justice Harlan interrupted Kaplan and asked him pointedly: ―Is the rule you
are asking for there you say is an absolute constitutional prohibition against taking
confessions from a juvenile no matter what the circumstances.‖229 Kaplan responded that
he had asked for such a rule because he thought it was ―the only workable rule with a
juvenile.‖230 However, he stated that the case could be decided under the ―narrowest of
principles.‖231
This exchange signaled that at least Justice Harlan was not likely to support any
broad rules of exclusion. This was no surprise. Justice Harlan had dissented in Miranda,
arguing that the due process voluntariness test was an adequate tool for dealing with
confessions.232 But when the next Justice to speak, Thurgood Marshall, began to
question the wisdom of a per se exclusionary rule, the chances of a groundbreaking
juvenile confession decision seemed to go out the window:
Marshall: What about the 18 year old who is a genius and is a senior, is in
college? Same rule?
Kaplan: We have a problem and may I be frank to admit Your Honor, I
don‘t know how to resolve it.
Marshall: Well you do have problems with all general rules like that don‘t
you?
Kaplan: Your Honor, we have a problem every day of our . . .

226

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
228
Id. at 9.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
227
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Marshall: Why don‘t you stick to the case you have which is a 14 year old
with 9 years of mentality, why don‘t you stick with that?‖233
¶80

¶81

Following Justice Marshall‘s lead, Kaplan returned to the basic facts of the case
and placed Hester‘s case squarely within the Court‘s precedents from Brown v.
Mississippi234 up to and including Miranda v. Arizona,235 paying particular attention to
Haley236 and Gallegos.237 According to Kaplan, Hester was younger than both boys in
Haley and Gallegos; in fact, he was probably the youngest defendant in the history of the
United States Supreme Court.238 Starting with the fact that Hester was not permitted to
see his mother, Kaplan listed all of the reasons why the confession was involuntary: ―the
mentality of the defendant, . . . his ability to withstand pressure, the fact that he was held
incommunicado, the fact that he was never taken before a magistrate,239 the fact that he
could not cope with his captives [sic].‖240 When you take a confession from a boy like
Hester, Kaplan argued, ―it‘s like the proverbial taking candy from a baby.‖ 241
Illinois Assistant Attorney General Joel Flaum began his argument with a
statement that the proof of guilt in Hester‘s case was overwhelming, even if the
confession was set aside. Justice Harlan immediately interrupted Flaum, noting that
Justice Schaefer had reached the opposite conclusion.242 Flaum began to explain why
Justice Schaefer‘s decision was wrong when he was immediately interrupted by Justice
Marshall:
Marshall: When did he first see his mother?
Flaum: He saw his mother, Your Honor, at 10 a.m. the following morning.
The statement made by counsel . . .
Marshall: When did he first have a lawyer?
Flaum: He had it on Monday morning, Your Honor, 48 hours later. And
he was not informed of his right to have counsel.
Marshall: When did you give this boy his mother?
Flaum: At 10 a.m. the next morning.
Marshall: That was after the interrogation.
Flaum: After the confession.
Marshall: And prior to the time the confession was written down, he saw
nobody who was friendly to him.
233

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 9–10.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
235
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
236
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
237
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
238
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 14.
239
Id. at 13–16. Justice Schaefer, in The Suspect and Society, revived the idea that suspects be taken in
front of magistrates, advised of their rights, and be interrogated by police officers in court, as a way to
protect suspects. See SCHAEFER, supra note 184. This idea was popular among scholars and reformers in
the 1930s—the age of the use of the so-called ―third degree‖ by police officers to obtain confessions. See,
e.g., Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L.
REV. 1224, 1228–31 (1932).
240
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 13.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 16.
234
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Flaum: Correct, Your Honor.
Marshall: And obviously there was no reason for depriving him of that,
was there?
Flaum: Well, Your Honor, this is the situation. 1961, what did the
prosecutors in Cook County have by way of case law to rely upon.
Marshall: They had mothers.
Flaum: I understand.
Marshall: And they knew this was a juvenile. They knew he was a 14
year old stuttering. . . .
Marshall: Well, what grade was he in?
Flaum: He was in the fifth grade, Your Honor.
Marshall: At the age of 14. Something was wrong.243
¶82

¶83

When Flaum tried to quarrel with Justice Marshall‘s suggestion of Hester as a
disabled youth, characterizing Hester as aggressive and not the shy, retiring, incompetent
youth portrayed by the defense, Justice Marshall continued to raise questions about the
police‘s actions in ―depriv[ing] the boy of his family‖ and using four officers to
interrogate Hester.244 Flaum eventually claimed that Hester was manipulative in the way
in which he made corrections to his statement to minimize his culpability, first stating the
killing was an accident, then later changing his story from ―kicking books that were on
the floor of the book room, to tripping over the books.‖245
Flaum began to distinguish Haley, the only precedent to guide the Chicago law
enforcement authorities at the time of the interrogation, focusing on the length of the
interrogations, the time of day of the interrogations, the fact that there were no relay
interrogations, and the location of the interrogations.246 In the middle of his discourse,
Flaum was interrupted by a question from Justice Harlan, which appeared to come out of
the blue and took Flaum by surprise:
Harlan: Was there any effort made to take this case to federal habeas?
Flaum: No, Your Honor, this case is . . .
Harlan: I know this case is on direct appeal. I realize that.
Flaum: Yes, it is, Your Honor. . . .
Harlan: As I listen to the argument on both sides, it is the kind of argument
where we are being asked to reassess the facts. I have not heard yet, from
anybody, the assertion of any principle of law that we‘ve laid down so far
that was misapplied in the judgment that the state court made on this
confession.
Flaum: Well, your Honor we suggest there has been no misapplication of
the law.247

¶84

Flaum spent the remainder of his argument trying to persuade the Court not to
create a per se rule. He admitted that such a rule ―may be supported by some of the
243

Id. at 18.
Id. at 21–22.
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Id. at 23.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 24.
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dictum in Gallegos,‖ but argued that it would do ―great harm to the administration of
justice.‖248 Flaum argued that the coupling of Miranda warnings with the totality test
was ample protection for juvenile suspects. In his argument against a per se rule, he
made several concessions that many prosecutors and courts would quarrel with today,
including that prosecutors have a ―heavier burden‖ in proving that a confession is
voluntary in juvenile cases.249
Flaum concluded by quoting Justice Harlan‘s dissent in Miranda: ―Society has
always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the
dark moments in the law. . . . We feel that the application and the calling for of a per se
rule is totally unwarranted by the Petitioner.‖250
Early in his rebuttal argument, Kaplan was interrupted by Chief Justice Burger:
―Counsel, are you going to tell us at some point whether there is any legal question other
than the voluntariness of the confession?‖ Kaplan moved on to some of the other
arguments in his brief but soon returned to the voluntariness of the confession. In his
final pitch to the Court, Kaplan, in a move that sounded of desperation, told the court that
the boy was innocent and reminded the Court that he had denied killing Mrs. Keane
under truth serum:
[W]hen you take this case, and the total absolute inability to cope with his
captors plus the fact that this is an innocent boy sitting in the penitentiary,
that an offer of proof as to a truth serum test was made, and that he passed
the truth serum test, that he denied unequivocally any knowledge of how
the woman had met her demise, I say that when a judge in chambers is
presented with testimony like that, although I can‘t find any basis in the
law to admit a truth serum test into evidence, that once he knows that a
boy has passed a truth serum test, some inquiry has to be made as to
whether or not the right guy is on trial. You can‘t just bury your head in
the sand and say the law doesn‘t allow the truth serum test to be
admissible in evidence.251

¶87

When asked by Justice Burger whether contrary results of a truth serum test would
have been admissible if offered by the prosecution, Kaplan responded by saying:
No, Your Honor, it would not have been admissible. All I am saying is
you had to live with this case. My associates and I, under the law of 1961,
couldn‘t get a dime to hire competent people to come to the state or people
from our own state to testify as experts. We spent $12,000 trying and
248

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
250
Id. at 27.
251
Id. at 30–31. In July 1961, a psychiatrist hired by the defense, Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, illegally
administered sodium amytal, the claimed truth serum, to Hester during an examination at the Audy Home.
Drug, Quiz Boy in Slaying, CHI. TRIB. July 7. 1961, at 1. Hearing screams from inside the room, a guard
entered the room and noticed that Hester was very drowsy. He summoned the chief nurse at the detention
center. Drug, Quiz Boy in Slaying, CHI. TRIB. July 7. 1961, at 1. The nurse checked the garbage can and
found the vial of sodium amytal. Id. Hester‘s attorneys were sharply reprimanded for Dr. Ziporyn‘s
actions by Judge Napoli. Id.
249
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appealing this case so we could bring in a blood expert, a pathologist, a
handwriting expert.252
And on that note, Kaplan‘s time was up.
XIII.
¶88

¶89

¶90

THE SUPREME COURT‘S SURPRISING DECISION

On April 27, 1970, the United States Supreme Court Clerk sent a telegram to the
attorneys of record in the case.253 The telegram notified the parties that the Court, in a
per curiam opinion, with dissents by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas, had
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.254 No reasons for the dismissal
were given, not even the standard language that often accompanies such dismissals:
―After having reviewed the record, and considered the briefs and oral arguments
submitted by both sides, we are satisfied that petitioner‘s claim does not merit the plenary
review that we thought it might deserve at the time petitioner‘s petition for certiorari was
granted.‖255
Generally, a writ of certiorari to a state court should be dismissed as improvidently
granted only on the basis of considerations that were not apparent at the time the writ was
granted.256 But no new facts emerged in the briefing or at oral argument. Nothing had
changed in the circumstances of the case from the time that certiorari was granted. The
case was still ―certworthy.‖257 Why then, did the Supreme Court dismiss the writ?
It‘s a question that has bothered Jerome Feldman, Hester‘s lawyer, for more than
forty years. Recently, Feldman told me that he and the Kaplans were stunned that the
Court had dismissed the writ.258 Feldman believed that the Court would not have taken
the case unless it was prepared to reverse the conviction.259 At the time of the grant of
certiorari, Feldman and the Kaplans were confident that they had at least six votes on
Hester‘s side—Fortas, Marshall, Brennan, Warren, Douglas, and Black.260 Although
Justice Black was a question mark, he had often voted with the liberal wing of the Court
in criminal procedure cases and had voted with Douglas in Haley and Gallegos, Fortas in
Gault, and Warren in Miranda. When Feldman and the Kaplans received the telegram,
they were left to speculate about what had happened. The only explanation they could
come up with was that the Court must have been deadlocked in a four to four vote on the
merits.261 This interpretation enabled them to rationalize the decision by attributing the
loss to the changes in the Court‘s personnel. If only Fortas had not resigned and Warren

252

Id. at 31.
See Western Union Telegram from Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 199.
254
Id.
255
Stephen L. Walsby et al, The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Function, JUDICATURE (1992).
256
STERN ET AL., supra note 16, at 328.
257
Id. Stern cites numerous examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has dismissed previously
granted petitions over the years, breaking down these cases into sixteen different reasons for the dismissals.
None of them seem applicable to Hester‘s case. Id. at 328–31.
258
Interview with Jerome Feldman, Attorney for Lee Arthur Hester (Jan. 19, 2011).
259
Id.
260
Id.
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Id.
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had not retired, they told themselves, Lee Arthur Hester‘s conviction would have been
reversed.262
As a novice in the intricacies of Supreme Court practice, I found Feldman‘s
narrative compelling and I clung to it in earlier drafts of this Article. Even though
avoiding a tie vote is not recognized as a legitimate basis for dismissing a writ, there were
practical reasons for the Court not to issue a four-to-four opinion. During Hester, the
Court was short a justice and still reeling from the resignation of Justice Fortas. Two
attempts by President Nixon to appoint Justices to replace Fortas had been rejected by the
Senate.263 Perhaps the Court did not want to issue an opinion of such importance with
only eight members sitting. A four-to-four decision would have let Hester‘s conviction
stand and would have been of no precedential value.
The first chink in this theory, however, came when I received from the Library of
Congress the files of Justice Douglas on the Hester case. Three documents in Justice
Douglas‘s files proved that Hester‘s attorneys‘ take on the reasons why the case was
dismissed was wrong. The first document was perhaps the biggest surprise. Dated
March 10, 1969, the document listed the voting on Hester‘s petition for certiorari.264
Hester did not get six votes in favor of granting the writ. He did not even get five. Justice
Fortas, who would seem to have been the justice most likely to vote with Hester after
Gault, had voted to deny certiorari.265 So had Justice Black.266 Fortas and Black were
joined by Justices White, Stewart, and Harlan in voting to deny certiorari.267 The four
who voted to grant Hester‘s petition were Justices Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, and Chief
Justice Warren.268
262

Id.
President Nixon sought to replace Justice Fortas first with Clement Haynsworth, a United States Court
of Appeals Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in August 1969. After Haynsworth‘s nomination
was defeated in the Senate in November 1969, Nixon nominated G. Harold Carrswell, a recent appointee to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in January 1970. The United States Senate failed
to confirm Carswell‘s nomination in April 1970. Justice Fortas‘s seat was finally filled on May 14, 1970
by Justice Harry Blackmun whose nomination was quickly approved. The Court had been shorthanded for
one year. See Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 63–64,
86–88, 100–03 (1979). The Justices had been hesitant to rule on some cases while shorthanded, including
those questioning the constitutionality of the death penalty and cert petitions where only three of the four
votes needed to accept certiorari were available. When Justice Blackmun joined the Court, he was assigned
nearly 200 pending petitions for certiorari to dispose of. Id. at 103.
264
William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Hester v. Illinois, Box 1456, Case 76-1459, 68 Terms
No. 691 Misc., No. 82.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id. Precisely why Justice Fortas voted to deny certiorari will have to remain a mystery until another
scholar decides to write on the Hester case. Justice Fortas‘s files are kept at the Yale Law School Library.
At the time this Article was due, I had hired a researcher to view Justice Fortas‘ files but she had not yet
finished her review. The fact that Justice Fortas voted to deny Hester‘s certiorari petition, however, does
not mean that he would have voted against Hester on the merits. Supreme Court decisions to grant
certiorari generally fall into four categories: (1) the decision below conflicts with the decision of a federal
court of appeals or a state court of last resort on an important federal question; (2) the lower court decision
on an important question of federal law conflicts with a Supreme Court decision; (3) the court below
decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme
Court; and (4) the lower court‘s decision is such a departure from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings as to require the Court to exercise its rarely used supervisory powers. Timothy Bishop et al,
263
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Justice Douglas‘s file also provided insight into why the Court decided to dismiss
the writ. A one-page sheet of handwritten notes from the Court‘s conference on the case
indicates that the Court met to discuss the case on November 24, 1969, less than a week
after the argument.269 According to the notes, presumably written by Douglas, four
justices had voted to affirm the Illinois Supreme Court‘s decision and three had voted to
reverse.270 The notes suggest that Chief Justice Burger seemed skeptical of Hester‘s
position but did not record his vote. Next to each Justice‘s initials was a summary of
their position. Next to an entry labeled ―HLB‖ for Justice Hugo Black, were the words
―confession not coerced—affirms.‖271 Justice William O. Douglas (―WOD‖) voted to
reverse ―on totality of evidence as to coercion.‖272 Justice John Marshall Harlan (―JMH‖)
saw ―nothing in the case‖ and voted to affirm.273 Justice William Brennan (―WJB‖) said
that it ―doesn‘t take much when dealing with a child to find coercion‖ and voted to
reverse. Justice Marshall voted to reverse based on ―Haley v. Ohio, et al.‖274 By Justice
Byron White‘s initials (―BW‖), the only notation is ―affirms.‖275 Only the notation next
to ―PS‖ for Justice Potter Stewart hints at the ultimate decision in the case. It reads:
―affirms—prefers to dismiss as improvidently granted.‖276
Justice Stewart‘s reasons for dismissing the writ as improvidently granted were
revealed in a ―Memorandum to the Conference‖ dated April 15, 1970. 277 In the memo,
Justice Stewart began by recounting the history of the Hester case before the Court. He
noted that the case was first presented in conference on November 21, 1969 (contrary to
the November 24th notes of Justice Douglas), and that the Court had tentatively voted to
affirm Hester‘s conviction by a vote of five to three. He announced to the Court that he
was now voting to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted and sought to persuade his
brethren to follow his lead.278
Surprisingly, Justice Stewart‘s reasons for dismissing the writ had nothing to do
with Hester‘s confession. Upon reviewing the State‘s brief on the merits, he noticed that
the State had delved more deeply into three of Hester‘s arguments than in its response to
the petition for certiorari. None of these three arguments related to Hester‘s confession.
The arguments concerned whether Hester was denied due process when a psychiatrist
Tips for Petitioning and Opposing Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, 34 LITIGATION 27
(2008). Justice Fortas, upon reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court‘s affirmance of Hester‘s conviction,
could have disagreed with Illinois court‘s determination that Hester‘s confession was voluntary, but
believed that it was not so out of line with prior Supreme Court decisions as to merit review. Moreover, the
Court almost never publishes the reasons for a denial of certiorari or even the vote count of the justices on
the cert question. At the merits stage, however, Justice Fortas would have had to put his reputation as the
champion of juvenile rights on the line; he would have had to take a stand on the voluntariness of Hester‘s
confession and a vote to affirm Hester‘s conviction would have raised questions.
269
William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Hester v. Illinois, No. 82, Box 1456, Case 76-1459,
Conference Notes, Nov. 24, 1969.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Potter Stewart 1(April 25, 1970); William O. Douglas
Papers, Library of Congress, Hester v. Illinois, No. 82, Box 1456, Case 76-1459 [hereinafter WODP].
278
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 277.
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who had examined Hester was precluded from testifying for him; whether Hester should
have been permitted to inspect police reports and test data that was made available to the
prosecution; and whether there was an unlawful search and seizure of Hester‘s clothing.
Although Justice Stewart did not think any of these claims had merit, he wrote that ―there
remain factual difficulties with respect to each of them which ―should be left to the
processes of federal habeas corpus.‖279 Accordingly, wrote Justice Stewart. ―I would
favor dismissing the writ as improvidently granted, though I do not find any new factors
in the case that were not known when we granted certiorari.‖280
Justice Stewart made clear in his memorandum that he did not think that any
factual difficulties existed with respect to the state courts‘ findings that Hester‘s
confession was voluntary, writing that the ―question of voluntariness and of whether a
per se rule should be imposed are presented as well here as they are likely to be presented
on habeas.‖281 With regard to these issues, Justice Stewart‘s position was crystal clear: ―I
think in view of the state court‘s supportable findings of fact, the confession was
voluntary and that a per se rule to the effect that nobody of 14 can make a voluntary
confession should not be adopted.‖282
Within days, Justice Stewart‘s memorandum had netted a majority of the Court‘s
votes. On April 15, the same day it was disseminated, Justice Harlan wrote a letter to
Stewart agreeing with his memorandum.283 On April 16, Justices Burger284 and Black285
wrote letters of support. On April 16, Justice Douglas, recognizing that he did not have
enough support to oppose Justice Stewart‘s memorandum, wrote the following letter:
Dear Potter:
Re: No. 82 – Hester v. Illinois
I have thought all along that there
should be a reversal because the confession was
involuntary.
But I am in a very small minority
and the thing turns upon a tangle of facts and
the Court apparently will follow your recommendation and dismiss as improvidently granted.
Therefore, I wonder if you would kindly
279

Id. at 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
281
WODP, supra note 277; Letter from Justice Harlan to Justice Stewart (Apr. 15, 1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
282
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 277, at 2 (emphasis added).
283
WODP, supra note 277; Letter from Justice Burger to Justice Stewart (April 16, 1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
284
WODP, supra note 277; Letter from Justice Black to Justice Stewart (Apr. 16, 1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
285
WODP, supra note 277; Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice Stewart (Apr. 16, 1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
280
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note at the end of that sentence:
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
W. O. D.286

Justice Douglas was later joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall.287
¶98
In retrospect, the fact that the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted is
perhaps not so surprising. Questions asked by justices during oral argument can
sometimes shed light on their reasons for dismissing a writ of certiorari. For example,
briefing and oral argument can change a justice‘s view of the case by clarifying issues of
fact and law that the justice may have misunderstood at the time of the grant of certiorari.
It may help him or her narrow an issue, see that the case at hand is not the best case to
resolve an issue, or decide that the case should be remanded back to the lower courts for
further factual findings.288 The comments of Justices Harlan at oral argument seem most
pertinent here. In particular, Justice Harlan‘s question to Flaum concerning whether the
petitioner‘s claims were vetted through federal habeas and whether either side is asserting
―any principle of law that we‘ve laid down so far that was misapplied in the judgment
that the state court made on this confession‖289 are the kinds of clarifying questions that
might indicate some hesitancy to decide the case. These comments, coupled with Justice
Burger‘s question to Kaplan on rebuttal about ―whether there is any legal question other
than the voluntariness of the confession,‖290 suggest an unwillingness on the part of these
two justices to review state court voluntariness determinations unless those decisions
were based on unreasonable applications of law. Although these two justices originally
voted to affirm Hester‘s convictions, their questions at oral argument suggest that Justice
Stewart‘s pitch to them to dismiss the case was not a tough sell.
¶99
The Court‘s decision later in the term in the case of another juvenile confession—
the case of Willie Monks—seems to confirm a hesitancy of the Burger Court to review
voluntariness issues on direct appeal from state supreme courts. Willie Monks was a
fifteen-year-old juvenile who had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
life in prison in New Jersey in 1957. The order granting certiorari in Monks‘s case was
issued on May 19, 1969, five days after Justice Fortas tendered his resignation to the
Court.291
¶100
Monks‘s case, in some respects, was an even more compelling case to strengthen
the protections for juveniles during interrogations because his interrogation was far
longer and far more coercive than Hester‘s. These circumstances were described by
Justice Marshall in his dissent from the Court‘s decision to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted:

286

Id.
Hester v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 660 (1970).
288
See Stephen L. Walsby, The Supreme Court‟s Use of Per Curiam Dispositions, The Connection to Oral
Argument, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1992).
289
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 24.
290
Id. at 29.
291
Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71 (1970).
287
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Petitioner, a 15-year-old boy, was arrested at 1 o‘clock in the morning of
February 16, 1957, removed to the police station, and questioned by
detectives for several hours about two purse-snatching incidents. He was
then held in confinement in the Children‘s Shelter for 10 days during
which time he was questioned at least three times by two detectives in the
presence of a juvenile probation officer. Further questioning began on
other crimes including two murders in the same area as the purse
snatchings.
During the entire 10-day period this 15-year-old boy was without advice
of his parents, lawyer, or friends. Indeed, his mother first learned he was
in custody after he confessed to the two murders. During the entire 10-day
period petitioner was never told he had a right to remain silent, or to refuse
to answer the questions by the two detectives.
The end came on February 26, 1957. Petitioner arose at 7 o‘clock in the
morning, questioning began at 10 o‘clock and continued off and on for 15
hours before the confession was typed. During this period he was moved
from the Children‘s Shelter to the courthouse, the grand jury room, and an
adjacent room. He was given several lie-detector tests and confronted
with alleged witnesses. He had no sleep. He was given sandwiches for
his lunch and dinner.292
Analyzing these facts in light of the Court‘s precedents in Haley and other cases,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas, wrote: ―Certainly, such treatment so clearly
violates [the Court‘s precedents in the voluntariness cases] as to require reversal in this
case.‖293
¶102
In dismissing Monks‘s writ as improvidently granted, however, the Court held:
¶101

Having scrutinized the record and considered the briefs and oral
arguments submitted on both sides, we are satisfied that petitioner‘s claim
of coercion respecting his confession, given by him over 12 years ago
upon his apprehension as an alleged juvenile delinquent, does not merit
the plenary review that we thought it might deserve at the time petitioner‘s
pro se petition for certiorari was granted.294
¶103

Although the result was the same as in Hester—a per curiam decision to dismiss
the writ as improvidently granted—the Monks Court added several words to its dismissal
order that did not appear in the Hester order: ―without prejudice to any further
appropriate proceedings below.‖295
¶104
The words ―without prejudice to any further appropriate proceedings below‖
essentially provided a roadmap to Monks‘s attorney to seek federal habeas relief.
Monks‘s attorney needed no such roadmap. Monks had been represented by Anthony
292

Id. at 71–72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 72.
294
Id. at 71.
295
Id.
293
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Amsterdam, a seasoned United States Supreme Court litigator, and a Stanford law
professor who had clerked for Justice Felix Frankfurter from 1960 to 1961. 296 Taking his
cue from the Court‘s ―without prejudice‖ language, Amsterdam, along with co-counsel
Richard Newman, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court in New Jersey. On March 6, 1972, the court granted Monks‘s petition, holding that
under the totality of the circumstances, Monks‘s confession was involuntary. 297
¶105
There is no way to reconcile the Court‘s decision to leave out the words ―without
prejudice‖ in Hester‘s case while adding them in Monks‘s. Hester‘s lawyers, who were
novices to United States Supreme Court practice, could have benefitted from the roadmap
given to Monks. Left to divine what the Court meant in its order, Hester‘s lawyers failed
to seek habeas review. The United States Supreme Court‘s decision to dismiss Hester‘s
writ of certiorari ended Hester‘s lawyers‘ long crusade to exonerate their client. In the
end, their failure to pursue habeas relief did not extend Hester‘s stay in prison. Hester
was paroled on August 24, 1972, after serving approximately ten years and nine months
in the Illinois Department of Corrections.298
¶106
The Court‘s decisions to dismiss the Hester and Monks cases as improvidently
granted do not hold up well under scrutiny. The truth is that there was no need for
federal habeas review in either case. The United States Supreme Court was accustomed
to reviewing voluntariness cases on direct appeal. Both cases had fully developed factual
records on the issues of voluntariness of the confessions in the state courts and clearly
articulated rulings by the trial court judges.299 No new facts emerged in the briefing or at
oral argument. Nothing had changed in the circumstances of the case from the time that
certiorari was granted. Both cases were ripe for plenary review and the Court‘s use of its
power to dismiss the writs as improvidently granted seems groundless.
XIV.
¶107

JUVENILE CONFESSION CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT AFTER HESTER AND
MONKS

The case of Lee Arthur Hester proved to be the last and best chance for the United
States Supreme Court to create a different set of rules for juvenile suspects, rules that
would have put them on ―less unequal‖ footing with their interrogators and rules that
would have ensured that they both understood their Miranda rights and did not waive
them without understanding the consequences of doing so. After the Hester and Monks
cases were decided, Justices Marshall and Brennan tried, for a decade or so, to keep
issues relating to the voluntariness of juvenile Miranda waivers and confessions alive,
but never could command a majority of the justices.
296

During briefing and oral argument, Professor Amsterdam, perhaps recognizing that the Burger Court
was highly unlikely to establish any broad, per se rules protecting children during interrogations, focused
exclusively on persuading the Justices that the confession was involuntary under the traditional totality of
the circumstances test. Brief of Petitioner, Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71 (No. 127) (1970), 1969 WL
119893, at *9–*25.
297
U.S. ex rel. Monks v. Warden, N.J. State Prison of Rahway, 339 F. Supp. 30, 33–34 (D.N.J. 1972),
aff‟d, 474 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir. 1972).
298
Recommendation for Final Discharge, Jan. 29, 1976 (submitted by Alonzo Whitlock, approved by G.
Gist) (on file with author).
299
In fact, the record in Monks‘s case was so well developed that the federal district court granted Monk‘s
habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing. Monks, 339 F. Supp. at 31.
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Both justices dissented from the denial of certiorari in Little v. Arkansas,300 a case
involving a thirteen-year-old ―dull‖ girl who had confessed to killing her father after
police arranged for the girl‘s mother, who was also a suspect, to meet with her and
persuade her to confess.301 Justice Marshall authored the dissent, suggesting that the
Court take up the question of ―whether, before a juvenile waives her constitutional rights
to remain silent and consult with an attorney, she is entitled to competent advice from an
adult who does not have significant conflicts of interest.‖302
¶109
In 1979, a sharply divided Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C.303 ruled that a
sixteen-year-old juvenile‘s request to see his probation officer did not constitute an
invocation of his right to counsel or to silence under Miranda. Expecting the boy to
invoke his legal rights with adult-like precision,304 the Court held that the same totality of
the circumstances test that governs adult waivers of rights should govern juvenile
waivers. Four justices dissented. Justice Marshall, whose dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan and Justice Stevens, called for a broad rule holding that Miranda requires that
interrogation cease whenever a juvenile requests an adult who is obligated to represent
his or her interests.305 Even Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, wrote that the
interrogators, who outnumbered the boy two to one and who were persistent in pressing
the boy to confess despite his numerous denials, failed to exercise the ―greatest care‖ in
ensuring that the confession was voluntary.306
¶110
Justice Marshall again dissented from the denial of certiorari in Riley v.
Franzen,307 a case involving a sixteen-year-old boy whose repeated requests to see his
father (who was at the station) before confessing were denied. 308 The issue presented in
Riley was whether a child‘s request to see his parents was ―the functional equivalent of an
adult‘s request for an attorney‖ and whether such a request must be honored by police
before continuing to interrogate.309 This time Justice Marshall stood alone in his
dissent—not even Justice Brennan joined him.
¶111
The ―totality of the circumstances test,‖ while theoretically giving judges
flexibility to take into account the unique vulnerability of children on a case-by-case
basis, has, in practice, offered little protection to juveniles. Without bright lines to
follow, courts have near-unfettered and unreviewable discretion to admit juvenile
confessions into evidence. As Professor Barry Feld‘s research has shown, when judges
¶108

300

Little v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 957 (1978).
Id.
302
Id. at 957–58.
303
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
304
Barry Feld, Juvenile‟s Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to Counsel, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 112 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
305
Fare, 442 U.S. at 729–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
306
Id. at 734 (Powell, J., dissenting).
307
Riley v. Franzen, 454 U.S. 1067 (1981).
308
Id.
309
Id. Justice Marshall dissented twice in the Riley case, first when the Court denied certiorari on direct
appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court, and again after Riley sought certiorari review of the denial of his
habeas petition.
301
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apply the test, ―they exclude only the most egregiously obtained confessions and then
only haphazardly.‖310
¶112
Moreover, in the post-Fare world, courts have only paid lip service to the unique
difficulties that children have in understanding their Miranda rights and knowingly and
intelligently waiving them. By and large, courts have not required police officers to
employ special procedures in administering the rights to child suspects.311 Justice
Douglas‘s recognition in Haley that the boy‘s waiver of his constitutional rights was not
entitled to much weight in assessing the voluntariness of his confession has also largely
been ignored.312 Once a suspect waives his rights, few courts in the post-Fare world are
willing to suppress juvenile confessions. The Miranda jurisprudence on knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waivers, has, to a great extent, displaced the voluntariness test.
XV.

CONCLUSION

Of Hester‘s three lawyers, only Jerome Feldman is still alive. I recently met with
Tom Geraghty, Laura Nirider, and some of our law students. Feldman, who still
practices some criminal law, is one of those veteran criminal defense attorneys whose
―gut feelings‖ are worth trusting. When he speaks about Hester‘s case, his passion about
his former client‘s innocence is much more than a gut feeling; he is absolutely convinced
of it.
¶114
Feldman also arranged for us to meet Lee Arthur Hester. Seeing Hester and
Feldman together was a moving experience. Although they had not seen each other for
several years, they embraced as if they were old friends. Today, Hester is sixty-fouryears-old. He still maintains his innocence and has authorized the Bluhm Legal Clinic to
investigate his case to try to prove his innocence.
¶115
Our investigation into Hester‘s innocence is in full swing. We have collected
numerous newspaper articles from the time of Hester‘s arrest and trial, obtained a copy of
the entire trial transcript on microfiche, and reviewed what remains of both the Feldmans‘
file and the court file. Although many key witnesses have died, we have located dozens
of witnesses to date, including several teachers from the Lewis-Champlin school. Not
surprisingly, the opinions of these witnesses divide largely along racial lines. Most of the
black teachers still believe that Hester was innocent, and most of the white teachers
remain convinced he is guilty.
¶116
Jerome Feldman has also given us a strong lead on the identity of the actual killer.
According to Feldman, shortly after Hester was arrested, Feldman received a call from a
psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute of the Municipal Court of Chicago, the forensic
court clinic charged with conducting mental health evaluations of criminal defendants.313
This psychologist told Feldman, in confidence, that a white man who was a janitor at
¶113
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Feld, supra note 304, at 113; see also Tamar Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles
After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 437–42 (2008).
311
Birckhead, supra note 310, at 445–46. One notable exception to this trend is In re Jerrell, C.J., 699
N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005), a case involving a fourteen-year-old convicted of armed robbery based on a
confession, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that all interrogations of juvenile suspects must be
electronically recorded.
312
Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Juveniles from
Unknowing, Unintelligent and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 431, 450 (2006).
313
Affidavit of Jerome Feldman, supra note 116.
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Lewis Champlin at the time of the attack, had tried to commit suicide shortly after Mrs.
Keane‘s murder.314 The psychologist told Feldman that when the janitor was brought to
the Institute to be evaluated, he had confessed to raping and killing Mrs. Keane and said
that someone else had been charged with the crime.315 Feldman‘s investigation led him
to believe that the man in question was not a janitor, but an engineer at the school, a
veteran of World War II who had a history of mental health problems and had been the
subject of several complaints by female teachers at the school.316 We have made some
progress in verifying Feldman‘s information but our investigation is continuing.317
¶117
So far our search for the semen swabs that were taken from Mrs. Keane or for
other evidence that could be subjected to DNA testing has been unsuccessful. We have
located some of the trial exhibits related to the case but have not located any clothing or
other evidence that could be subjected to testing. Unless we are able to find the evidence
and do DNA testing, proving Hester‘s innocence will be an uphill battle.
¶118
Regardless of whether we are able to exonerate Hester, my discovery of his case
has only fueled my passion to pursue greater protections for youthful suspects. Together
with my colleagues Bernardine Dohrn, Laura Nirider, and Joshua Tepfer, we have
created an organization—the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth—whose mission
is to ―identify, investigate, and litigate credible claims of wrongful convictions, provide
resources to actors in the juvenile and criminal justice systems, and advocate for policy
reforms that will decrease the chance that any juvenile will be wrongfully convicted.‖318
We are advocating for a number of reforms to prevent false and coerced confessions,
including mandatory electronic recording of all interviews and interrogations of juvenile
suspects, witnesses, and victims. As Hester‘s lawyers did more than forty years ago, we
are calling for the exclusion of confessions in criminal court that are the product of
interrogations of juveniles without counsel. We also hope to create developmentally
appropriate interview and interrogation practices, practices that improve the likelihood
that juveniles understand their Miranda rights and can intelligently waive them and
reduce the risks of juvenile false confessions.
¶119
In the years since Hester‘s case was dismissed, the case for these protections for
juvenile suspects has only gotten stronger. Numerous studies have supported Justice
Douglas‘s belief articulated in Haley that many juveniles, especially those under the age
of fifteen, are not capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving their Miranda rights
without the advice of counsel.319 New scientific discoveries about juvenile immaturity
and lack of judgment, including new understandings about juvenile brain development,
have helped to explain why juveniles may be more willing than adults to confess falsely
314

Id.
Id.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
See About Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, NW. U. SCH. L.,
http://www.cwcy.org/AboutUs.aspx.
319
See Saul Kassin et al., supra note 164, at 7–9; see also Barry C. Feld, Juvenile‟s Competence to Exercise
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 100 (2006) (finding in
study of recorded police interrogations that juveniles over the age of fifteen are as capable as adults in their
understanding of Miranda but that those under sixteen, especially those under age fourteen, may require
special protections such as the presence of an attorney or interested adult to assure that their waivers are
knowing and intelligent).
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when pressured by police.320 There have been dozens of documented cases of wrongful
arrests and convictions of juveniles, many of which have been the result of false
confessions by juvenile suspects or false statements by juvenile witnesses.321 These cases
and others involving adults are contributing to a newfound concern—one increasingly
shared by law enforcement322—about the reliability of confession evidence and leading to
some of the most significant reforms in the criminal justice process since the due process
revolution of the Warren Court.323
¶120
Perhaps the most promising development, however, is that the United States
Supreme Court, for the first time in decades, has recognized that juveniles are
developmentally different from adults, and therefore less deserving of the same
punishments.324 If the Court can be persuaded that these same differences—immaturity,
vulnerability to outside pressure, diminished capacity to weigh risks and long-term
consequences, and greater compliance with authority figures—make juveniles more
vulnerable to police pressure during police interrogations, perhaps the legacy of Haley,
Gallegos, and Gault can be revived, and the United States Supreme Court will finish its
unfinished business.

320

See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
55 (2007).
321
Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of
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